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The Navy Supply System has been in existence for some
twenty-one years, but after all this time there is still no
precise definition of just what it is. Indeed , a recent Navy
publication on the subject states candidly that "there is no
Navy Supply System in the sense of an organization wit: a
structure of command and inherent responsibility."-^ This is a
rather startling statement to the uninitiated. This publication
goes on to state:
But there is, of course, a system by which the Navy is
supplied — a system which has evolved through the years,
adapting itself to the changing requirements demanded both
by the application of technological advance and the acquisi-
tion of new responsibility. After the manner in which men
formalize their actions, it has become known as the Navy
Supply System. 2
'Aost efforts to describe the Navy Supply System have
concentrated on how it functions rather than how it is organized,
simply because of the absence of any unified organizational
structure. The aforementioned publication is no exception; it
resulted from the effort of a study group which had as its task
the definition of the Navy Supply System. But this task of
defining a virtual phantom proved to be an elusive one and the
study group redirected its effort to the writing of a book which
-kj.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Supplying the Navy (NAVPERS 10487), 19^7 > p. 1.
2Ibid.

2describes how the Navy is supplied.
The focus of this paper is on organization, but it
purposely avoids any attempt to describe the organization of the
Navy Supply System per se , for the reason already mentioned. Of
course there are identifiable organizational elements which play
specified roles in the process of supplying the- Navy, even though
there is no discrete organizational bond which holds them to-
gether. To avoid the aura of attempting to define the undefin-
able, this paper uses the term "Navy supply support organization"
rather than the formalized title Navy Supply System. It is hoped
that this will permit the necessary latitude which may otherwise
be unattainable if an attempt were made to stay within the rigid
bounds of the Navy Supply System, whatever that may be.
The Probler
If there is a single word which best characterizes the
Navy supply support organization during the past twenty-five to
thirty years, that word must be "change." Many of these changes
can be attributed to the pressure of external events such as a
major war and the unification of many supply matters under the
Defense Supply Agency. But many have been prompted by internal
pressures, some of which can be traced to the vague definition
of the Navy Supply System and the resulting fragmented authority
and responsibility. Control of certain segments of the supply
system has been the subject of continuing debate. This "tug-of-
war" has generated a plethora of studies and has resulted in
several changes in responsibility, with still other potential
changes in the offing.

3The purpose of this study is to trace the historical
development of the Navy supply support organization in the hope
that insight into the past will facilitate evaluation of the
present. In particular the study will:
1. review the system of supply which existed during
World War II
2. examine the organization for Navy supply support
at the time the integrated Navy Supply System was created
(1S&7)
3. describe and analyze the more important changes
which have taken place since 19^7
4. identify and evaluate the reasons why «hese chan:^.,
have occurred, and
5. appraise the current Navy supply support organiza-
tion and the prospect for further modification.
Sources of Information
The accomplishment of this thesis was largely a library
research effort. The vast majority of historical information
was obtained from the NAVSUP library, which contains a veritable
wealth of material on past events affecting the Navy Supply
System and the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. Information
about the changes which have transpired was obtained primarily
from the official files of NAVSUP : s Planning Division, sup-
plemented by library research and the personal experience of the
author Many of the thoughts expressed about the current or-
ganization grew out of informal discussions with personnel of the
NAVSU? Planning Division, to whom the author is. indebted.

4Assumptions and Limitations
In developing the story of the Navy supply support
organization it has been useful to limit discussion in several
respects in order to reduce complexity and thereby promote
clarity. Specifically, the following limitations have been
observed:
1. Attention is focused on the Naval Supply Systems
Command (NAVSUP) and its predecessor the Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts (3USANDA), along with their field org " 1 and
other major operational participants in the supply process. In
so doing, the policy making role of superior Navy cz ids is
not described, including the role of the Chief of Naval Opera-
tions in what has in the past been termed "consumer logistics."
2. The discussion of NAVSUP 1 s responsibilities is
limited to matters relating to the supply system, with inten-
tional omission of related responsibilities in areas such as
accounting, transportation and field purchasing.
3. Overseas activities are excluded from discussion,
despite their obvious importance. The purpose of this study can
be adequately served by limiting the discussion to activities in
the continental United States.
4. Only major participants in the supply support scheme
are given emphasis. Indeed almost every ship and shore activity
in the entire Navy has some part to play in the supply story,
but most are either customers or are relatively inconsec.u.ontial
as elements of the support organization.
5. A description of supply functions is purposely

5avoided except as is necessary for clarity in describing or-
ganizational matters.
6. While some use has been made of theoretical con-
siderations, no attempt has been made to explore the subject of
organization theory in depth.
In addition to staying within the constraints noted
above, this paper assumes a basic familiarity with the Navy's
bureau organization. Beyond this, an attempt has been made to
keep the discussion in relatively non-technical terms to
facilitate understanding by those only casually familiar with
the Navy supply support organization.

CHAPTER I
SYSTEMS OF SUPPLY PRIOR TO 19^7
Pre-War Situation
In the years before World War II the process of supply
support of the Navy was relatively routine and uncomplicated.
The pre-war Navy was comparatively small and the ships and air-
craft were not too complicated in terms of specialized equipment.
There were only about 75,000 items of supply to contend with,
and very few of these were of a technical nature. The peacetime
environment permitted adherence to standardized procedures, with
a high degree of centralized control over procurement and distri-
bution. 3
The Bureau of Supplies and Accounts (BUSANDA)^ was
responsible for the procurement and distribution of what was
termed standard stock. The concept of standard stock had evolved
over a long period of reasonably static conditions ; the term was
used to describe replenishable material which was common through-
out the Navy and for which specifications were relatively stable
and the requirements well known. Included as standard stock
were such things as cleaning gear, paint and office supplies as
3~J.S., National Military Establishment, Munitions Board,
Staff Report on Materiel Distribution Systems of the National
•liiitary Establishment
,
June 30j 1949, pp. 12-13.
TA list of abbreviations and acronyms used 'in this report
is on page vi.

7well as common hardware and tools. 3USANDA was also responsible
for fuel, clothing, provisions and ship's store material.
Contrasted with this were equipment spare parts, which
were generally obtained along with the original equipment. Re-
plenishments of these technical spare parts were small in volume;
procurement was generally decentralized and most of these parts
were obtained directly from the manufacturer. Specifications
usually required the approval of the cognizant Navy technical
bureau.
5
Within BUSANDA there was a central stock control office
which was responsible for the procurement and distribution of
standard stock material. But this centralized control did not
exist for technical material; each of the technical bureaus
performed inventory control functions for the peculiar material
under its cognizance. However, much of this technical material
remained in the physical plant controlled by BUSANDA because of
its overall responsibility for storage and transportation.^
There were only two Naval Supply Depots (Norfolk and San Diego)
in existence in the pre-war era, but these were supplemented by
the storage facilities at nine Navy Yards and three aviation
supply activities. 7 These latter activities generally carried
material peculiar to their own needs rather than for resupply of
other activities.
^National Military Establishment, Staff Report on Materiel
Distribution Systems . . , p. 12.
6Ibid
., pp. 12-13.
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, History of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts in
World War II; A Synopsis , 194-7* P« 97
»

8The centralized control of standard stock material in
the supply system can be attributed to the strong centralized
procurement responsibility of BUSANDA. Entry of items into the
system was closely regulated by virtue of this control over
procurement. Field activities obtained replenishment by forward-
ing requests to BUSANDA on a periodic basis. These requests
were consolidated in the Bureau and necessary schedules were
prepared for procurement. The schedules were used to obtain
bids from contractors, and after completion of the contracts
the material eventually arrived at its destination.
Effect of World War II
This standardized, business-as-usual procedure worked
well during peacetime, when operational demands were minimal.
But BUSANDA was ill prepared for the tremendous requirements
imposed upon the supply system by our entry into World War II.
As stated by Captain H. C. Lassiter at the 19-^7 Conference of
Supply Corps Officers:
The need for change from the long established procedures
"was not apparent . . . until the full impact of the war hit
us more or less unexpectedly and found us incapable of coping
with the tremendously increased requirements for literally
millions of newly developed technical items.
9
And Admiral Julius Furer, in his history of the Administration
of the Navy Department in World War II, noted that "BUSANDA had
visualized its wartime role as simply an expansion of its
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Conference of Supply Corps Officers , Sept. 29 through
Oct. 4, 19*47, P. 79-
9lbid., p. 80.

9traditional peacetime functions." 10 He states that, although
BUSANDA had conceived of its primary task as one of procurement
coordination, insufficient action v/as taken to implement this
assumption.
The inevitable result was a change in the Navy's procure-
ment procedure "because of the sudden, urgent and overwhelming
demands of wartime." 11 The sheer magnitude of wartime supply
requirements was in itself staggering, but in addition there
occurred a technological explosion which added severe complica-
tions. This is exemplified by the increase in the number of
items in the supply system from 75*000 prior to the war to about
2,400,000 by the end of the war. 12 of the latter figure, ap-
proximately 75 per cent were non-standard technical items.
The inability of BUSANDA to cope with the volume and
technical complexity of the burgeoning wartime requirements
resulted in a splintering of procurement responsibilities. Each
of the technical bureaus (Ships, Ordnance, Aeronautics) began to
develop special systems of supply for each new category of
material introduced into the system. And needless to say, under
the pressure of wartime conditions, these new systems were not
constructed to conform to a common pattern nor to provide a
single uniform system of supply to the Navy. Each was designed
10Julius A. Furer, Administration of the Navy Department
in World War II
,
(Washington: U.S. Government Printing Office,
1959), P. 440.
Ibid.
^National Military Establishment, Staff Report on




to meet the immediate requirements of the situation. 13
So where it should have been expected that BUSANDA would
become the core of a centralized supply system for the entire
Navy, in practice the opposite occurred. As stated in the
History of BUSANDA in World War II:
Control over procurement and its auxiliary processes
was broadcast throughout existing Bureaus and offices, and
in many instances new offices were established to carry
out extensions of normal activity.
The effect was not only to circumvent the Bureau at
the beginning of the supply process, i.e., procurement,
but also to duplicate its field functions of storage,
transportation and issue. Each new agency developed its
own procedures to handle its special materials right down
the line from purchase to use, resulting in not one, but
a multitude of Navy supply systems. 1^
All told there were some thirty different distribution
systems of various composition which were in existence by the
end of the war.^5 Theoretically each of the bureaus was buying
only its own peculiar technical items, with BUSAKDA still
responsible for standard stock. But the technical bureaus,
unbeknownst to one another, were buying materials which should
have been standard stock under the misapprehension that they
were specialized. This was an inevitable consequence of the
multiple supply systems in existence and the result was a great
deal of duplication. Many items with identical end use were
entering into the stream of supply under slightly different
specifications and different manufacturers part numbers. This
^BUSAKDA, Conference of Supply Corps Officers , 19^7 9
p. 2.
l2hiistory of BUSANDA in World War II
, p. 2.
-^National Military Establishment, Staff Report on




produced a situation in which no single offlee in the Navy knew
which items had been procured , what they were for, where they
were stocked or in what quantities.-1-
In recapping these circumstances, the History of 3USANDA
in World War II concluded that:
1. No single supply system existed in the Navy in
World War II.
2. The Navy Department's bureau structure did not
accommodate simple expansion; wholesale . . . reorganiza-.
tion was necessary to fulfill the needs of logistics.
3. Organization, in effect, of a multitude of supply
systems brought about intra-Navy competition for the same
end items . . .17
It is against this background that postwar developments must be
considered. The problems occasioned by the existence of separate
systems were recognized during the course of the war, but it was
not practical to make wholesale changes at that time.
Field Activities
Before proceeding with the changes which occurred after
the close of the war, let us introduce the supply field activi-
ties into our story. These activities not only played an im-
portant part in the wartime supply process, but they are also
the subject of much of the ensuing discussion in this paper.
Of course there was a tremendous expansion in the number and
size of field activities during the war, along with virtually
everything else connected with the war effort.
loHistory of BUSANDA in World War II
, p. 3.
17;bid




Historically, most Navy shore activities came into
existence as an extension of and a part of the natural growth
of the bureaus. 18 For example, the Bureau of Aeronautics estab-
lished and operated air stations; the Bureau of Ordnance estab-
lished and operated ordnance plants and ammunition depots; and
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts established and operated supply
activities. At the peak of World war II there were about 7,000
field activities operated by the Navy Department, including some
850 whose primary mission was procurement or supply. 19 Of course
most of these activities were relatively small and had specialized
missions; our concern in this study is with the comparatively
few major activities which predominated in size and importance.
As was previously mentioned, there were only txtfo Naval
Supply Depots in the pre-war era — those at Norfolk and San
Diego. But the rumblings of war in Europe and the beginning of
the Navy s s expansion in 1939 set the wheels in motion for rapid
development of additional storage facilities. Table 1 shows
the major depots under BUSANDA's control at the end of the
war.20
l8u.s., Department of the Navy, Review of Management of
the Department of the Navy , Study 6, Facilities Management
Study , Oct. 2b , 1962, Vol. Ill, p. 18. This study is one of
'chose in the group commonly known as the Dillon Report.
19purer, p. 519.
20Data for this table were obtained from the official
files of Naval Supply Systems Command, supplemented by History
of BUSANDA in World War II and Report of Survey of Activities




MAJOR DEPOTS WIDER BUSANDA CONTRO]




NSD Norfolk, Va 1927^ a )
Cheatham Annex 1943
NSD Bayonne, N. J 1942
NSD Newport, R. 1 1942
Gulf Coast
NSD New Orleans 1942
West Coast
NSD San Diego, Calif 1922
NSD Oakland, Calif 194l
Stockton Annex 1945
Aviation Supply Annex .... 1942
NSD Seattle, Wash 1942
NSD San Pedro, Calif 1942
Torrance Annex (b)
Inland
NSD Mechanic sburg, Pa. 1942
NSD Scotia, N. Y 1943
NSD Clearfield, Utah 1943
NSD Spokane, Wash 1943
Specialized
Naval Aviation Supply Depot,
Norfolk, Va. 194l
Naval Aviation Supoly Depot,
Philadelphia, Pa 1943
Naval Clothing Depot,
Brooklyn, N. Y (b)
(a)originally established in 1919 a s Naval Supply
Station, Norfolk.
(b)Dates of establishment could not be determined
for these activities. However, they were established some
time during World War II.

14
The need for Navy coastal depots is self-evident. The
four inland depots were constructed both for reasons of dispersal
and to alleviate overcrowded conditions at coastal locations.
The crowding at coastal storage sites necessitated the use of
multi-story buildings which were unsuited for modern storage
methods and easy handling of large quantities of supplies. The
inland locations were chosen with the objective of their capa-
bility to back up the coastal system. They were strategically
located on main railroad lines and were laid cut and constructed
where room was available for properly designed single story
warehouses. They were designed so that warehouse operations
would be facilitated by taking advantage of modern storage
methods and large scale use of materials handling equipment.":
Together with Stockton Annex, which was similarly designed,
these five efficient storage facilities provided nearly 30,000,000
gross square feet of storage space. This was :.:ore than the com-
bined total of all of the coastal depots.
In addition to the NSD's, maximum use was also made of
the supply facilities of non-BUSAiMDA activities. Principal
among these were the Navy Yards and major Air Stations, along
with assorted other activities such as Ammunition Depots,
Submarine Bases and Training Centers. Of course these non-
BUSANDA activities were used extensively by their own parent
bureaus for distribution of technical material in the several
supply systems which they created during the war.
"National Military Establishment, Staff Report on
Materiel Distribution Systems . . . , p. 57.

15
There is one wartime development which stands out in the
annals of Navy supply — the development of the supply-demand
control point (SDC?) concept. An SDCP was not responsible for
physical storage of material; rather its responsibility was for
the control of material through centralized determination of
requirements, procurement and distribution through established
storage activities. The Aviation Supply Office (ASO) in Phila-
delphia was the first activity of its kind, with responsibility
for world-wide control of aeronautical materials. It was some-
what of a hybrid organization which brought together the technical
expertise of the Bureau of Aeronautics (BUAER) and the supply
expertise of BUSANDA. ASO was an outgrowth of the Supply Depart-
ment at the Naval Aircraft Factory in Philadelphia, which during
the 1930' s had been given progressively greater authority over
the distribution of aeronautical stores. The demands of war
and the rapid technological developments in aircraft design
required a responsive supply support organization to cope with
the complications of supplying the aeronautical organization.
ASO met this challenge; it assumed the responsibility for pro-
curing and distributing technical aeronautical material under
an integrated system that recognized the need for special treat-
ment of the air arm. 22 i>he ASO was deemed to be a model of
inter-Bureau cooperation which established a pattern destined
to be followed for other major categories of Naval material.
Similar offices were established for ships 5 parts and ordnance
material during the war, but their state of development did not
approach that of ASO.
-'-




In the pre-World War II years BUSANDA played a dominant
role in the supply support of the Navy by virtue of its cen-
tralized control of the procurement and distribution of standard
stock. The Navy was relatively small and there -..ere not many
complicated* equipments to support. The tempo of operations
permitted the use of standardized, albeit time-consuming., methods
of central procurement by BUSAKDA.
The enormous and urgent demands of wartime pre/:-- to be
more than BUSANDA 1 s cumbersome peacetime system could cope with.
The war also produced rapid advances in technology , thez -by
complicating the supply problems, which now included the support
of a vast array of technical equipment. In view of these prob-
lems, technical bureaus gained the responsibility for procuring
and distributing material to support their own peculiar equip-
ment. The result was fragmentation of the supply system into
some thirty separate supply systems, with the inevitable dupli-
cation of many common items of supply. No single office in th
Navy knew what was being procured, where material was located,
or what it was for.
The war also brought about a tremendous expansion of the
Navy shore establishment. Supply activities multiplied in number
and size; major storage activities under BUSANDA* s cognizance
increased from just two in the 1930' s to some nineteen by the
end of the war. Large inland supply depots came into existence
for the first time. In addition, extensive use was mace of
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supply facilities at activities such as Navy Yards and / .r
Stations, whose primary mission was other than supply.
World War II also produced an innovation in supply
management 9 the creation of the first supply-demand control
point. ASO grew out of a marriage between technical functions
and supply functions, the responsibilities of two separate Navy
bureaus. The concept was deemed so successful that ASO was to
be used as a model for additional ICP's in the future.

CHAPTER II
THE INTEGRATED NAVY SUPPLY SYST:.:..
Recognition of the Need
The difficulties occasioned by the Navy's multiple; supply
systems during the war were widely recognized. The officers
who were involved with operating these systems certainly were
aware of the need for change, notwithstanding the fact that
little could be Cone because of the pressure of events while
the war was in progress. Captain Lassiter had this to say on
the subject:
Throughout the xvar Supply Corps officers, who were in a
position to observe the trends, were giving considerable
thought and effort to the development of a single Navy
Supply System, in which BUSANDA would play its rightful
role as the business managers and supply administrators
of the Navy, and the technical bureaus would contribute
their part by supplying the required technical knowledge
and effort. 23
The problem x^as also recognized in the reports of several
study groups, the most notable of which were the following:
1. Strauss-Draper Report, 19-!-^ « This group was pri-
marily concerned with the extent and character of Army-Navy
coordination of procurement, but it of course had to examine
procedures within each service. It concluded that there was a
definite need for more comprehensive and effective coordination





in the procurement field. 24
2, Eberstadt Report, 1945 . This report addressed
itself primarily to the broader questions of unification of the
Armed Services and national security, but it also spoke spe-
cifically to the fields of procurement and logistics. It cited
as a basic weakness in Navy logistics the absence of centralized
control mechanisms due to the lack of a standard classification
of naval material. (This, of course, was brought about by the
multiple, uncoordinated supply systems.) Without such a standard
classification, the report states that the Navy was seriously
handicapped in its attempts to establish adequate inventory
control, establish control over the use of storage and shipping
space and port utilization, and establish comprehensive distribu-
tion plans. The Eberstadt Board felt that one of the major
obstacles to be overcome to achieve a greater degree of coordina-
tion was the traditional and deep-rooted desire of the Naval
bureaus for autonomy. 25
3. Hancock Report, 1946 . Perhaps one of the more cogent
reports was that of the Hancock Committee, which was appointed
on October 24, 1945 by the Secretary of the Navy for the express
purpose of studying the Navy's supply system. This report
stressed the necessity for a sound organizational framework
which, In time of war, can be built upon rather than being built
around. The report states that "in the war just ended many
2
^"U.S., Congress, Senate, Unification of the War .
ITr.yy D - " ^.rtments and Postwar Organization for National |e<
_i____ »
79^b Cong., 1st Sess., 194-5, pp. 115-llb. This is a Senate
Committee Print of the report commonly known as the Eberstadt
Report.
25ibid.
, pp. 116 and 128.
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changes were made in organizational set-up and in powers granted
to different agencies, resulting in frequent overlaps of authority
and unnecessary confusion as to the responsibility for carrying
out different parts of the program.
"
26
At war's end the weight of evidence was clearly in favor
of remodeling and revitalizing the Navy's supply system. The
many deficiencies in the multiple wartime systems could no longer
be tolerated. The Eberstadt Report stated it well:
The great resources and productive power of this country
permitted us to afford the luxury of inefficient procedures
this time. It may not be possible again. It would seem
imperative, therefore, that we take measures which will
hereafter assure better teamwork and will enable us to
achieve the full benefit of all of our resources. 2?
Birth of a Plan
After the termination of the war it was only a matter
of months before action was underway to bring out the changes
which were so badly needed. In response to representations of
the Chief of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, the Chief of
Naval Operations (CNO) directed BUSANDA to conduct an exhaustive
study and present an Integrated Supply Plan. 2^ The initial
directive, issued on January 5* 19^6* established the principles
considered necessary for the development of an integrated supply
2°U.S., Department of the Navy, Report of the Special
Committee Appointed by the Secretary of the Navy to Study 'ch
Navy's Supply System , April lybb, pp. 3-^-
2?Eberstadt Report, p. 2$).
2°U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, "The Navy Supply System," Monthly Newsletter from the
Bureau of Supplies and Accounts , XIII (October 19^9) > P« tf«
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system. 29 This was followed by a second letter on February 21,
1946 which directed BUSANDA to proceed with the development of
•DA
the plan.^
In the ensuing months an intensive study effort was
undertaken, led by a BUSANDA committee with the participation of
representatives from other bureaus and offices. The completed
plan was submitted to CNO on June 24, 1946.31 There followed a
series of discussions and meetings at which points of disagree-
ment were worked out to the extent possible. The modified plan
was then submitted to the Secretary of the Navy, who on
February 14, 1947 approved the plan "in principle as forming a
sound basis for the coordination and further development of the
supply system of the Navy. "32
A thorough review of this plan is certainly unnecessary
for the purpose of this study; however, since it is the corner-
stone upon which the present Navy Supply System' was built,
mention must be made of those parts which are relevant to the
organizational fluctuations which will be examined in this study.
In particular let us review certain of the precepts, theses and
recommendations of the study.
29Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, serial
0078P411, dated January 5, 1946.
30Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, serial
300P411, dated February 21, 1946.
3^-Letter from the Chief, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts,
serial L8-l(l-l) (OW), dated June 24, 1946, with enclosure
entitled "A Study of an Integrated Naval Supply System."
32Letter from the Secretary of the Navy to the Chief of
Naval Operations, February 14, 1947.
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1. Precepts. The Secretary of the Navy had established
certain principles to govern the control of Navy inventories.
One of these was that supply-demand control points (SDCP's)
should bo established for all types of Navy material. (This was
obviously a result of ASO's success.) In addition, CNO enunciated
certain principles to govern the establishment of a Navy Supply
System. Among these were:
a. Where common facilities and functions may render
a more effective and economical operation, the facilities and
functions concerned should be consolidated.
b. In order to lessen the likelihood of destruction
by enemy attacks, major stocks should be withdrawn into the
interior of the continent, and sufficient dispersal should be
provided to prevent disruption of material logistics support in
the event of military loss of any one activity. 33
2. Theses. A useful summation of the theses upon which
the plan was based was presented by the 19^7 Conference of Supply
Corps Officers. The main thesis was that the functions to be
performed in the operation of any supply system can be grouped
into two main divisions: supply functions and technical functions,
Further, the performance of technical functions is peculiar to
the particular type of material, but the supply functions are
equally applicable to all types of material. It then follows
that a single bureau should be charged with the performance of
all of the supply functions for all types of material and that
each technical bureau should be charged with performing the
33BUSANDA, Monthly Newsletter , October 19^9, p. 16.
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technical functions applicable to the particular type of material
for which it is responsible.
The next thesis upon which the supply system is based
is that for any category of material the supply and technical
functions must be performed in conjunction with each other.
Close liaison and Interchange of information must be maintained
if the system if to be responsive to operational needs. This
principle is, of course, embodied in the structure of an SDCP.
A third thesis was that, regardless of which bureau had
technical control of the material and regardless of itfhich control
point controlled it, all material belongs to the Navy and is not
the personal property of any Bureau or control point. To avoid
such a proprietary claim, the plan proposed that ail replenish-
able material be financed under a revolving fund, the Naval
Stock Fund. 3^
3. Recommendations. Those recommendations which are
pertinent to this study are noted below.
Recommendation 1 . That the Chief of BUSANDA be charged
with coordinating the operation of the supply functions of the
Navy Supply System and be assigned the responsibility for the
performance of the supply functions in the Navy Supply System,
and be vested with the necessary authority to discharge his
responsibilities, with the advice of the technical bureaus . . .
Recommendation 4 . That the following "supply offices"
be established by SECNAV, jointly responsible to the Chief of
the technical bureau concerned and the Chief of BUSANDA, to




administer within the Navy Supply System the supply of the par-
ticular type of material concerned:
a. Ordnance Supply Office.
b. Yards and Docks Supply Office.
c. Medical Supply Office.
d. Ships' Parts Supply Office.




g. Gyro Supply Office.
h. Submarine Supply Office.
i. General Supply Office.
0*. Provisions Supply Office.
k. Ship's Store Supply Office.
1. Clothing Supply Office.
m. Aviation Supply Office.
Changes, including additions, to the above list of
"supply offices" should be made as experience indicates desirable.
Recommendation 5 « That categories of material of a
replenishable nature shall be included in the Navy Supply System
as jointly decided upon by the cognizant technical bureau and
the Chief of BUSANDA.
Recommendation 6 . That the procurement of all naval
material included in the Navy Supply System will be financed by
the Naval Stock Fund. (NOTE: This recommendation was not ap-
proved as written but was approved with revised wording to the





Recommendation 7 . That the field supply activities be
organized as follows:
a. Major fleet and overseas supply support activi-
ties — Naval Supply Centers.
b. Other major supply activities — as Naval Supply
Depots, Naval special supply depots or supply departments as
appropriate.
Recommendation 8 . That specific supply activities be
established as follows:
a. Naval Supply Center, New York.
b. Naval Supply Center, Norfolk.
c. Naval Supply Center, Oakland.
d. Naval Supply Center, Puget Sound.
Recommendation 9 « That a comprehensive plan covering a
period of ten years be prepared to cover the geographical de-
centralization of the facilities required . . .
Recommendation 10 . That the principles governing the
dispersal of local supply facilities be developed by BUBOCKS with
the advice of the Chief of BUSANDA and the technical bureaus . .
Recommendation 14 . That the system of supply, the de-
velopment of which is proposed herein, be known as "The Navy
Supply System" . . .35
All of the aforementioned recommendations were approved
oy SECNAV with the exceptions that recommendations one and four
were not applicable to BUMED at that time, the wording of recom-
mendation six was modified as noted above, and recommendations
S^BUSANDA, Monthly Newsletter , October 1$49, p. 25.
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four and eight were approved subject to revision of the lists of
activities as circumstances dictate. BUSANDA was charged with
the implementation of certain basic elements of the plan.
To help understand the organizational relationships
created by the Navy Supply System, Figure 1 presents the organi-
zation chart as it was envisioned at the time of SECNAV f s ap-
proval. The chart has been divided into three major levels:
the top management level, bureau level and operating level. The
top management level was responsible for making broad material
policies and reviewing the performance of the overall operation.
The bureau level could be called the operating management level
for it was this level which exercised detailed management control
over technical and supply functions in implementation of top
management's policies. The operating level consists of the
various SDCP's which performed the detailed operations necessary
to operate the supply system. The operating level also includes
the field supply activities, but the specific organizational
relationships for these activities were not given expression in
the organization chart of the Navy Supply System.
Across the top of the chart are listed the various types
of material included in the Navy Supply System. Each of these
types of material falls under the technical cognizance of a
technical bureau, and they have been appropriately grouped on
the chart. The original plan envisioned the establishment of a
separate SDCP for each of these major types of material, as shown
on the lower portion of the chart. Note that there are two
different shaded lines on the chart, one representing the techni-
cal functions and one representing supply -functions. The
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Fig. 1.—The Navy Supply System
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technical functions stem from each of the technical bureaus to
the appropriate SDCP's whereas the supply functions stem only
from BUSANDA and extend to all control points. BUSANDA is shown
twice on the chart to reflect its dual capacity as Navy-wide
manager of supply functions and as the technical bureau for fuel,
general stores, clothing, ship's store stock and provisions.
The dotted lines represent the liaison which takes place at the
bureau level.
Thus, both the technical functions and the supply
functions are married together in the SDCP's to insure the proper
and adequate supply of the materials under the cognizance of





Implementation of the Navy Supply Plan .
> l
Action commenced almost immediately to implement the
approved recommendations of the Navy Supply Plan. Of course,
I
as with any plan, the experience gained in the process of imple-
mentation caused some changes in thinking and resulted in modi-
fications to the grand design. Nevertheless the framework of
the fledgling system developed rather rapidly, and by
September 19^7 the Ifollowing SDCP's were in existence; 37
I
1. Aviation Supply Office, Philadelphia
2. Ordnance Stock Office, Washington
3. Ships' Parts Control Center, Mechanicsburg
4. Electronic Supply Office, Great Lakes





5. Submarine Supply Office, Philadelphia
6. General Stores Supply Office, Philadelphia
7. Clothing Supply Office, Brooklyn
8. Yards and Docks Supply Office, Port Hueiieme
9. Navy Ship's Store Office, Brooklyn
Several of the originally planned SDCP's were consolidated
in the interest of efficiency and economy. This resulted in five
of the categories of material under 3USHIPS' technical cognizance
being placed under the control of the Ships 1 Parts Control
Center, namely i searchlight equipment, hull and machinery parts,
internal combustion engines, gyro equipment and motion picture
parts. In addition, it was decided not to activate the Fuel
Supply Office and the Provisions Supply Office for the time
being; however* the Fuel Division and Subsistence Division of
BUSANDA were actually operating as SDCP's anyway. Establishment
of the Personnel Supply Office was dropped from the plan. 38 And,
of course, BUMED had been excepted from the plan by SECKAV, so
no further thought was given to establishing a Medical Supply
Office.
While the SDCP's were created in substance, much work
remained to be done in molding these new organizations into a
viable part of the total Navy Supply System. Each of the SDCP's
initially functioned independently of each other without any
coordinated control. Therefore there was a need to standardize
certain elements of their operations in order to establish control
coordination. In addition to the procedural matters of stock
status reports and stock record cards, standardization was needed
5Q Z';.L-:. . 3 pp. 82-83.
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in the organization of the SBCP's themselves and in their dis-
tributive organizations. 39
The formal acceptance of the SDCP concept for all types
of Navy material was undoubtedly the most profound development
arising from the Navy Supply Plan. But a new concept for storage
activities was also given status: the Naval Supply Center (NSC)
concept. Prior to the development of the Navy Supply Plan two
NSC's had been created in the Pacific area, under the command
and administrative control of the fleet commander. NSC's Pearl
Harbor and Guam-Saipan were established effective January 1,
19^6.^ These two supply centers were comprised of branches
which stocked all types of material, including general stores,
ordnance, ship's spare parts, electronics, etc. The branches
were staffed with personnel having the necessary specialized
knowledge of the particular type of material stocked by that
branch. There was an officer in command of the NSC who was
responsible for coordination of the functions of all branches to
insure that the branches were integrated into a unified supply
center.
The Navy Supply Plan proposed the establishment of four
NSC ! s in the continental United States. Two of these (Norfolk
and Oakland) were commissioned by the end of 19^7* but establish-
ment of the other two (New York and Puget Sound) was held in
abeyance. The existing NSD's at Norfolk and Oakland formed the






275P4I1, dated December 11, 19^5
.
'°Lett he Chief of Naval Operations, serial
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assumed the responsibility for technical materials which had
been under the control of other depot-type activities in their
respective areas.
The distinguishing feature of an NSC, as opposed to an
NSD, was the former's broad responsibility for a wide range of
material, including technical material. Organizationally the
NSC's were composed of a number of component supply depots, each
responsible for a particular category of material; e.g., aviation
material, general stores. Each of the component depots was
semi-independent and had an Officer-in Charge who was responsible
for the depot's operation. However, the center organization
provided services common to all of the component depots and acted
to insure the integration of the several components into a
coordinated, unified supply center operation.
This supply center organization followed as a corollary
to the commodity breakdown of the SDCP's. The concept permitted
the development of expertise in a particular commodity area and
served to facilitate direct communications between a commodity
manager (SDCP) and its major material outlets. ^ In brief the
Naval Supply Center organization permitted decentralized opera-
tions through the component depots while at the same time
retaining centralized coordination control, policy guidance
and administrative direction.
in
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Appraisal of Reorganization of Naval Supply Center
,
Norfolk. Va., September I960, p. 1.
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Evaluation of the Plan
The plan for an integrated Navy Supply System received
very favorable comments from some highly placed sources.
CKO in his letter which forwarded the plan to SECNAV
for approval, offered the opinion that the plan "provides a
sound and effective framework for the establishment of an
efficient, economical, and flexible system of supply, capable
of serving the Navy in either peace or war." The letter went
on to enumerate several features of the plan which were con-
sidered noteworthy. 4-2
The Secretary of the Navy, in his annual report for
19^7, stated that the Navy Supply System was developed in order
to take advantage of wartime experience, and that this new
system "obtains and assures the characteristics of responsiveness,
flexibility and economy that are essential for effective and
efficient supply support. "43
Perhaps the strongest testimonial, however, was contained
in a task force report of the Hoover Commission. This task
force reviewed the supply systems in the entire Federal govern-
ment, and had this to say about the Navy system:
The Navy . . . recognizes that supply problems form a
common pattern, and has centralized responsibility for them
in its Bureau of Supplies and Accounts. To assure a uniform
supply system that meets the needs of the technical bureaus,
various items are grouped into types which can be controlled
^Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations, serial
1918P411, undated (about December 19*1-6).
^"3u.S., Department of the Navy, The Annual Report 01




from a specific supply demand control point. The maximum
degree of uniformity consistent with the various types of
materials is obtained under the Navy supply system. 44
The task group had previously taken note of the fact that the
Navy Department was the only executive agency wherein the various
elements of the supply system were organized and administered as
a separate and distinct function. The group was sufficiently
impressed with the Navy system to recommend that the Army and
Air Force adopt a similar system. ^5
In spite of these kudos , the Navy Supply Plan was not
without its shortcomings. Certain of these may be identified
at this point.
For one thing, it is evident that the goals of the plan
have not been completely realized and perhaps never will be.
In particular, BUSANDA has not achieved the position envisioned
by the first recommendation of the plan. There appears to be
little doubt that BUSANDA has had the responsibility for co-
ordination of supply functions; but the responsibility for
performance of the supply functions in the Navy Supply System,
together with the necessary authority to discharge this responsi-
bility, have been notably lacking in some important instances.
Without developing this point further at this time, let us cite
some of the factors which may have had a bearing on the matter:
^ \Russell Forbes, Task Force Report on the Federal
Supply System (Appendix B) , report prepared for the Commiss ion
on Organization of the Executive Branch of the Government,





1. The Navy Supply Plan makes no mention of the organi-
zational relationships pertaining to field supply activities.
For example, what degree of authority does BUSAKDA have over the
supply department of a Naval Shipyard or Naval Air Station? The
plan specifically recognizes, in recommendation seven, that
supply departments would be one form of organization integral to
the system.
2. The plan does not define the extent to which BUSAKDA
should be responsible for performance of supply functions nor
the type and level of authority necessary for this purpose.
3. The plan is not specific as to the types of material
to be included in the Navy Supply System. The only criterion
indicated was that material of a replenishable nature shall be
included, but this was subject to negotiation between the
technical bureau and BUSANDA.
The delineation of these vague areas in the plan is not
meant to imply that the drafters lacked foresight. In all
probability this was the extent to which they could go and still
obtain the necessary concurrence of the technical bureaus. As
was previously noted, the Eberstadt Board felt that one of the
major obstacles to be overcome was the traditional and deep-rooted
desire of Navy bureaus for autonomy. Had the plan been made more
specific, it may have become too unpalatable for the technical
bureaus and could have resulted in complete failure. As it
developed, -the Navy Supply Plan did not solve ail supply problems;
but it did provide a solid foundation for a system which was a
marked improvement over its predecessors. At the time of its
approval it was estimated that implementation would require a
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full ten years, a period of time during which many wrinkles
could be ironed out. The remainder of this study, accordingly,
will review the organizational changes which have taken place
since the Navy Supply Plan was approved and discuss some of the
factors which must be considered in evaluating the current
organizational pattern.
Summary
The need for revamping the Navy's supply system after
the end of World War II was widely recognized. The officers
who were involved with the wartime supply problems were acutely
aware of the need for improvement. In addition, several study
groups cited the existing problems and made recommendations for
improvement.
Work on devising an integrated Navy Supply System was
begun shortly after the end of the war. Secretary of the Navy
Forrestal approved the new Navy Supply Plan on February 14, 19^7 •
The main thesis embodied in the plan was that supply and technical
functions could be separately identified, and that there is a
commonality in the supply functions which can be applied to all
categories of material. Because of this commonality, supply
functions should be the responsibility of a single bureau —
BUSANDA. The marriage of supply and technical functions was to
take place in a series of commodity oriented field activities
called supply-demand control points, which were to be jointly
controlled by BUSANDA and the cognizant technical bureau.
Implementation of the approved plan was aggressively
pursued. By the end of 19^7 there were nine supply-demand control
points in existence. In addition to the SLCP's a new concept
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for storage activities was inaugurated. Naval Supply Centers
were created at Norfolk and Oakland, similar to those previously
established in the Pacific. These NSC's contained a series of
component depots which specialized in a particular type of
material, paralleling the material specialization of the SDCP's.
The central headquarters of the NSC was responsible for overall
coordination of the efforts of these component depots to insure
unity of action for the center as a whole.
The new Navy Supply Plan received several favorable
comments, Including those of the Chief of Naval Operations, the
Secretary of the Navy and the Hoover Commission. However, the
plan was vague in several areas, a fact which may in part be
responsible for some later difficulties. Notwithstanding its
shortcomings, the Navy Supply Plan was a considerable improvement
over the existing system and charted a course which was to be




Since 19^7 the Navy supply support organization has
undergone almost a complete metamorphosis. The basic concept
of the Navy Supply Plan has endured, but within the bounds of
this concept a great deal of organizational transformation has
occurred.
In tracing the development of the Navy supply support
organization one must necessarily concentrate on the role of
BUSANDA, the Navy's supply manager. In particular , this study
concerns itself with the shaping and reshaping of BUSANDA'
s
field organization on the premise that such changes are a
manifestation of the policies of the headquarters organization
and of the forces bearing upon it. This chapter enumerates the
major changes to the BUSANDA field organization which have
occurred since the implementation of the Navy Supply Plan in
19^7 and describes the reasons why these changes have taken
place. ^°
To provide a degree of orderliness in the presentation
of this topic the changes to be discussed have been categorized
under four major headings: further development of the system,
^"^Unless otherwise noted, the information contained in
this chapter was obtained from the official files of the




the trend toward centralization, economy measures and the effect
of a BUSHIPS decision. These categories have been selected for
convenience and should not be construed as being mutually
exclusive. For example, economy measures have usually resulted
in greater centralization; and the converse is also true, that
centralization has usually resulted in economies. However, for
our purposes we will single out one factor which was the pre-
dominant influence for a given action.
In recognition of the confusion which may result from
attempting to negotiate this labyrinth of organizational
changes, a complete record of establishments, disestablishments
and changes is presented in Appendix A.
Further Development of the System
Subsequent to the initial flurry of action in 19^-7
several additional field activities were established as a
direct result of the continuing implementation of the Navy
Supply Plan. As could be expected, these new activities were
of two types; additional supply demand control points and
additional component depots under the Naval Supply Centers.
As noted in Chapter II there were nine SDCP's in
existence at the end of 19^7 • This number remained constant
for five years, but in 1952 three new SDCP's were established.
1, Medical and Dental Supply Office . It will be
recalled that BUMED was originally excepted from the Navy Supply
Plan "at that time." The establishment of M&DSO terminated
this exception with BUMED and BUSANDA joining in a federation
for the management of medical material.
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2. Fuel Supply Office . This activity took over the
functions formerly performed by the Fuel Division of BUSANDA.
Its establishment was anticipated in the Navy Supply Plan but
was' held in abeyance. Creation of FSO, therfore, represents a
decentralization of functions from headquarters to the field.
3. Provisions Supply Office . The circumstances sur-
rounding the creation of this office are identical to those
of FSO. Functions formerly performed by a division of BUSANDA
were decentralized to this new field organization.
From 1952 to the present time there were only two ad-
ditional SDCP's established before events began to reverse the
trend, causing a drastic reduction in number. The T raining
Device Supply Office was established in 195& at Port Washington,
New York, to manage equipments used in the training of personnel.
In 1957 the Forms and Publications Supply Office, Byron, Georgia,
was established for the management of the material indicated by
its title.
As for the NSC's, additional component depots were
established as the need developed and the desirability of semi-
autonomous status was recognized. At the time NSC Norfolk was
established there xvere four component depots created: General
Supply Depot, Aviation Supply Depot, Ordnance Supply Depot and
Publications Supply Depot (plus continuation of Cheatham Annex
in its previous status). Subsequently the following component
depots were established:
Ships' Supply Depot October 19^-8
Fuel Supply Depot July 1951
Special Weapons Supply Depot December 1951
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Yards and Docks Supply Depot March 1953
Provisions Supply Depot September 1955
Similar expansion was experienced at NSC Oakland, which
originally contained only three component depots: General,
Aviation and Ships (plus Stockton Annex and the Fuel Annex).
Additional depots were established as follows:
Ordnance Supply Depot April 19^-8
Fuel Supply Depot November 1950
Yards and Docks Supply Depot October 1951
Medical and Dental Supply Depot July 1952
The Medical and Dental Supply Depot was established at
the same time that BUSANDA assumed supply management responsi-
bilities for medical material and established an SDCP for this
purpose. The M&DSD, NSC Oakland was the successor to the former
Naval Medical Supply Depot, Oakland which had been under the
management control of BUMED.^-7 BUSANDA also assumed management
responsibility for the Medical and Dental Supply Depot, Edgewater,
New Jersey, at this same time.
There were some other actions which, while not fitting
neatly into the category of further development of the system,
are best discussed at this point.
1. The Naval Supply Depot, Great Lakes was established
in July 19^7. This NSD was an outgrowth of the Naval Training
Center Supply Department and was created to furnish supply support
to the many Naval activities in the midwest. While not spe-
cifically mentioned in the Naval Supply Plan, establishment of
^U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Center,
Oakland, Command History , December 195& > P« 45-
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NSD Great Lakes certainly falls within BUSANDA's responsibility
for performance of supply functions, as stated in recommendation
Wo. 1 of the plan.
2. A Special Weapons Supply Annex was created at NSD
San Diego in December 1951 as the West Coast counterpart of
SWSD, NSC Norfolk. Since KSD San Diego was not organized in
accordance with the existing supply center concept, this new
activity was termed an annex rather than a component depot.
3. Navy Fuel Depots were established at Jacksonville
in April 1951 and at Casco Bay, Maine in August 1953* Since
there was no NSC or NSD at these locations, the fuel depots were
established as independent activities directly under 3USANDA.
Establishment of the several activities noted above
extended from 19^7 through the mid-1950' s, at which time the
expansion in the BUSANDA field organization came to an end.
With one exception (to be discussed in a later section) organiza-
tional actions after this time were characterized by centraliza-
tion, consolidation and contraction.
Trend Toward Centralization
Perhaps the most significant trend in the field of
supply management during recent years has been the movement
toward centralization. This is primarily evidenced in the
efforts to achieve unification and integration within the
Department of Defense.
The pressures for unification in military supply had
been building for a number of years, but very little was ac-
complished until 1956. The military services generally resisted
such measures, resulting in much foot-dragging and an allegation
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by a Congressional subcommittee that unification rested largely
on paper. It is not the purpose of this study to review the
background which preceded unification of military supply matters,
but a brief mention of some of the pertinent events will suffice
to show the amount of interest in the subject. 48
As was noted in Chapter II the Strauss-Draper Report
(1944) addressed itself to the subject of Army-Navy coordination
of procurement and the Eberstadt Report (1945) was concerned
with the unification of the Armed Services, including the fields
of procurement and logistics. Since that time "there has been
a long series of congressional legislation, proposed legislation,
officially sponsored studies, GAO reports, DOD Directives, and
studies — all aimed [at least in part] at the integration,
coordination, and consolidation of the military services' supply
systems. "49 Some of the more pertinent are:
The National Security Act of 1947, Public Law 253.
The 1949 Amendments to the National Security Act.
The First Hoover Commission, 1949.
The O'Mahoney Amendment of 1952, Public Law 488.
The Rockefeller Report of 1953 — DOD Reorganization
Plan No. 6.
The Second Hoover Commission, 1955.
^"°See Roland Rieve, "The Defense Supply Agency:
Background and Prospects" (Thesis submitted to Industrial
College of the Armed Forces, 1962) for a good description
of the background leading to establishment of the Defense
Supply Agency.
'9u.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and




The most pointed recommendation came out of the second
Hoover Commission, which proposed the establishment of a separate
civilian-managed agency, reporting to the Secretary of Defense,
to administer common supply and service activities. 50 The
prospect of a "fourth service of supply" was, of course, anathema
to the military services. Thus the increasing pressure and
continuing criticism prompted DOD to inaugurate the "single
manager" concept, under which one service has supply management
responsibility, for a given category of material, for the needs
of all services.
In 1956 four commodity Single Manager Operating Agencies
(SMOA's) were established — for food, clothing, medical and
petroleum products. 51 These SMOA's had DOD-wide inventory
management responsibility, similar to the Navy-wide responsibility
which had been vested in Navy SDCP's. The existence of these
single-managers obviated the need for Navy SDCP's to perform
item management functions for the designated categories of
material. However, the Navy saw a need for an intermediary
between the single-manager "wholesaler" and the "retailers" in
the Navy distributive organization. So the creation of the single
managers produced the dual requirement to disestablish the
cognizant Navy SDCP's for the four commodity areas and establish
in their stead a new type of activity, Navy Retail Offices.
5^u.S., Commission on Organization of the Executive
Branch of the Government, Business Organization of the Department
of Defense , June 1955, p. V5~.
^BUSANDA, Proceedings of the 1961 Commanding Officer
Conference, p . OL-iUT
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The specific actions which resulted from creation of the
first four single-managers are as follows:
1. The Provisions Supply Office was disestablished,
with simultaneous establishment of the Navy Subsistence Office
(a retail office).
2. Clothing Supply Office was disestablished, with
simultaneous establishment of the Navy Clothing and Textile
Office.
3. Medical and Dental Supply Office was disestablished.
However, since Navy was designated as the single manager for
medical material, two separate activities were created to replace
M&DSO (and the Army and Air Force counterparts). The Military
Medical Supply Agency became the single manager for medical
material, and the Navy Medical Material Office assumed the
responsibility of a Navy Retail Office.
4. Navy was also designated as the single manager for
petroleum products. The Military Petroleum Supply Agency was
established for this purpose; however, the Fuel Supply Office
remained in existence to perform the Navy Retail Office functions
for petroleum.
One storage activity fell victim to the unification
effort begun under the single managers. Medical and Dental
Supply Depot, NSC Oakland was disestablished in September 1957 >
with its functions transferred to the Army's Sharpe General
Depot.
In 1959 and i960 there were four more single managers
established— for general supplies, industrial supplies,
construction supplies and automotive supplies. These four
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affected only two Navy SDCP's3 G-SSO had been responsible for
both general and industrial supplies while Y&DSO was responsible
for j among other things, automotive and construction supplies.
Since Y&DSO managed some material which was not moving to a
single manager, it remained in existence in a dual capacity —
as an SDCP and as a retail office for automotive and construction
supplies. In the case of GSSO, all material under its management
v/as to move to the new single managers. However, since Navy was
designated the single manager for industrial supplies, the
expiring GSSO was reconstituted as the Military Industrial Supply
Agency. The MISA also assumed retail office responsibilities for
all material formerly managed by GSSO.
The single managers turned out to be the precursors of
still greater unification and centralization. As stated in the
DOD Supply Management Reference Book:
The single manager agencies proved successful in
reducing supply inventories and operating costs while
maintaining effective support . . . ; however, as they
grew they developed their own doctrines and procedures.
A single manager was needed to control the single manager
agencies. 5>^2
Under the impetus of the new Secretary of Defense,
Robert S. McNamara, studies were conducted in 1961 which led to
the establishment of the Defense Supply Agency. The DSA became
the consolidated wholesaler for assigned common items of
supply. 53 All of the commodities previously assigned to the
single managers were assigned to DSA, which in addition, was
given a sizable new responsibility for common electronics
2 U.S. , Department of Defense Supply Management




material. Unlike the single managers, which were organizationally
located within the framework of one of the military services
,
DSA moved upstairs a notch and was responsible directly to the
Secretary of Defense.
The creation of DSA had its impact on field activities,
as could be expected. All of the single manager operating
agencies became Defense Supply Centers (e.g., Defense Industrial
Supply Center) under the management control of DSA. Thus the
Navy's three SMOA's (for industrial, petroleum and medical
material) ceased to exist as Navy activities.
An additional difficulty was encountered as a result of
the Navy*s loss of the single managers. Two of them had been
performing retail office functions (MMSA had assumed retail office
responsibilities from the disestablished NMMO in July i960) which
had to be continued by the Navy and for which there was no ready-
made home. Rather than create two new retail offices, the
decision was made to incorporate retail management functions for
industrial, general and medical material into a single new
command — the Fleet Material Support Office (FMSO). The idea
behind the creation of FMSO was to provide an organization with
responsibility for several coordinative functions, notably in.
the area of weapon systems management. But two of the basic
factors were the need for performance of retail management
functions and for liaison with DSA.5^
5^U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Proceedings of the Navy Supply Conference , 196*2,
pp. E-3 througn E-i>.
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The growth and development of DSA continued to have its
effect upon the functional responsibilities oi 2 Navy supply
support organization, but the above narrative completes the saga
of the effect of unification of military supply matters on the
nature and existence of Navy field activities. There is one other
significant event, however, which must be discussed under the
heading of centralization. In this instance the centralization
was internal to the Navy, but the phenomenon is .just as real.
The event to which we refer is the implementation of a new
concept for the organization of Naval Supply Centers whereby the
component depots are merged into a single large supply activity.
As was discussed earlier, the component depots of an NSC
were semi-independent commands under the overall command and
coordination of the parent supply center. Over the years certain
problems developed and modifications were made to the basic
structure. In a BUSANDA study of NSC Norfolk the following
statement was made:
. . . the autonomous operation of the component depots
presented problems in scheduling and controlling workload,
assigning personnel to meet fluctuations in depot workloads,
providing simple and coordinated replies to customer in-
quiries and in implementing standard methods and procedures.
Additionally, the progressively more restricted and limiting
budgets pointed to practical difficulties in maintaining
relatively independent depots with duplicate administrative
and service functions.
Gradually, over the period from 19^7 to 1957 > attempts to
solve the inherent problems of the organization at NSC
Norfolk led to the centralization of the following common
functions: disposal, receiving, shipping, packing, preserva-
tion, delivery, physical inventory, preparation of invoices
and updating of stock records. In effect this left the
functions of control and storage of material as the residual
responsibilities of the component supply depots. 5i?
55u.s., Bureau of Supplies and Accounts, Appraisal of





Another important factor pointing toward consolidation
was the emergence of automatic data processing, which brought
nexv concepts for paperwork handling. The first ADP equipment
used in the Navy supply support organization was introduced in
the middle 1950' s, and it was thought that eventually computers
would assume the bulk of the routine control functions at supply
activities. 5°
As a result of the problems and considerations noted
above, the decision was made to abolish the several component
depots and consolidate their functions into the Center organiza-
tion as of April 1, 1958. However, Cheatham Annex and Special
Weapons Supply Annex maintained their identity as components of
the NSC because of their unique characteristics.
Physical consolidation of the component depots was a
huge undertaking, and not without its problems. For this reason
the reorganization of NSC Oakland was held in abeyance until
lessons learned at Norfolk could be used to advantage. In
November i960 all component depots at NSC Oakland were dis-
established with the exception of the Fuel Supply Depot, which
retained its separate identity until June 1962.
While the actions discussed in this section have been
the major ones brought on by the trend toward centralization, as
they affected the Navy supply support organization, they are by
no means the only ones. Many other consolidations have taken
place at the local level in the field organization, particularly
where several organizations in the same geographical area




pressure is unrelenting in its demand for economy, and this has
led to the consolidation of a broad range of common service
functions at Naval Base complexes. In the field of supply the
"area support' 5 concept has been developed to accomplish this end.
Further discussion of this matter is reserved for Chapter IV.
Before leaving the subject of centralization a word of
caution is considered appropriate. Back in 1952 Vice Admiral
C. W. Fox , then Chief of Naval Material, noted that "the most
apparent trend in the field of supply management is toward
centralization. "57 At that time efforts toward centralization
were in their infancy, with actions having been taken in the
areas of cataloging, procurement and cross-servicing and the
initial entrance of DOD into supply management operations.
Admiral Fox noted the possibility of a "fourth service of supply"
and sounded a vigorous warning against permitting this to occur.
On the subject of centralization he stated that there were two
false conclusions then prevalent, viz .
:
That there is an inherent virtue in centralization and
complete standardization ...
That bigness of itself begets economy . . .58
In view of the turn of events since 1952, Admiral Fox
was certainly correct in his observation about the trend toward
centralization. Perhaps some of his deepest concerns are now
facts of life. Do his warnings on the false conclusions about
centralization foreshadow a reversal of the trend or will we see
still more centralization? ' Only time will tell.
57u.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Proceedings of the Supply Management Conference





Use of the term "economy" as a prime factor in the
operation of the supply support organization has perhaps been
in vogue ever since there was such an organization. Certainly
it permeates the documents reviewed by this writer in conducting
the research for this paper. Often-times the word seems to have
been little more than a cliche , but within the past decade a
number of actions have leant realism to this over-worked word.
In terms of the supply field organization the effecting
of economies is, of course, a one way street -- that of reductions
and closures. The realization of such economies might arise from
voluntary actions, such as when an activity is closed because it
is no longer required, or from a relatively coercive action such
as a budgetary squeeze. The supply activities which were dis-
established in the first ten years after the Navy Supply System
was born seem to fit in the former category while those within
the past ten years tend toward the latter.
The initial post-war effort to review the requirement
for supply support facilities resulted from the appointment of
a board by the Chief of BUSANDA on August 28, 1946. The board
was instructed to "survey the shore activities operating directly
or indirectly under the cognizance of BUSANDA and to recommend
increases, reduction, reallocation or abandonment of facilities
to adequately provide balanced supply support to the post-war
Navy. "59 when it first convened, the Board found the following
59u.S., Department of the Navy, 3ureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Survey of Activities Under BUSANDA Cognizance
,
January 15, 194? , p. 1 of forwarding letter.
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facts to be pertinent:
a. The wartime supply establishment was substantially
the same size as that existing shortly after V-J Day. Many
activities existed for which the necessity and mission were
not clearly defined on a peacetime or mobilization basis.
b. Strategic and economic considerations could not
long^support facilities which were developed during the
war. 1 '60
In its report the Board made a number of recc. : .relations
for reductions in storage facilities. While these reductions
may have seemed significant at the time, they now appear almost
trivial as compared with many of the rather drastic actions in
recent years. Briefly, the Board's recommendations for reduction
in storage facilities can be summarized as follows:
1. Several Naval Storehouses were recommended for
disestablishment. These were not major activities but had been
established for expediency as adjuncts to larger activities in
order to alleviate crowded storage conditions.
2. A reduction in the scope of activities was proposed
for NSD Newport, NSD San Pedro, Cheatham Annex and NASD Norfolk.
3. NSD New Orleans was recommended for disestablishment
as of March 1, 1947. This was the only primary storage facility
to be recommended for closure, and it was a very small one at
that.
Other than NSD New Orleans there were only four additional
closure actions effected by the mid-1950 9 s, as follows:
1. Naval Clothing Depot, Brooklyn was closed in
January 1951
2. Torrance Annex of NSD San Pedro was disestablished







facilities were subsequently used again by NSD San Pedro, thence
by NSY Long 3each, and presently by NSC Long Beach.
3. Medical and Dental Supply Depot, Edgewater, New
Jersey was closed in August 1954, with its functions being
assumed by NSD Bayonne.
4. Naval Supply Depot, San Pedro was disestablished in
November 1955 > leaving the Supply Department, NSY Lore Beach as
the major supply activity in the Los Angeles/Long Beach area.
At this same time the Naval Fuel Depot, San Pedro was established
as a separate activity of the Navy rather than becoming a depart-
ment of the shipyard.
The increasing pressure for economizing has been most
evident within the past ten years. Whereas BUSANDA's constella-
tion of supply support field activities was reduced by only five
during the years 1947 to 195&, there were no less than fourteen
activities disestablished since 1958 (exclusive of those noted
in the section on centralization). A listing of these activities
is presented in Table 2, along with the dates of disestablishment
and the anticipated annual savings. No attempt will be made to
trace the disposition of the myriad functions involved. Suffice
it to say that they were absorbed by remaining supply activities,
so that a measure of consolidation and centralization was at
least a by-product of these closure actions if not the primary
motive.
In reviewing the history of these closure actions it is
quite apparent that budgetary pressure has been pervasive. An
early example is found in the proceedings of the 1952 Navy Supply
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( a )Exclusive of disestablishments attributable to
unification of military supply functions under DSA and to
reorganization of Naval Supply Centers.
costs.
('o)Annual savings are exclusive of one-time closure
( c /Figures no longer available.
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stressed because of the many pointed questions being directed at
the Navy by Congressional Committees, the Office of the Secretary
of Defense and the Bureau of the Budget. 6l jn endeavoring to
find ways to achieve the necessary economies, a listing of
"major deficiencies" was presented to the conferees. Included
in this listing were several which help explain, at least in
part, why seme future closure actions were undertaken. The
following are representative of the deficiencies noted:
(1) The cost of operating our inventory control functions
is excessive, being completely out of proportion to the sales
made.
(2) The number of different items stocked in the system
is too high . . .
(3) The system is full of excess, slow-moving and dead
items
. . . , with the result that valuable storage space
is occupied and excessive funds are required ...
(7) Several of our distributive systems call for the
duplication of stocks of the same items at several supply
activities in the same location . . . ^2
In the pursuit of correcting the deficiencies noted and
continuing the refinement of the integrated Navy Supply System,
::\c.ny improvements were obviously made. Whether the quest for
improvement or the compulsion of the budget was the principal
cause of base closures is a moot pointj but it goes without
saying that a significant number of activities were closed in
the name of economy.
This movement has been spurred considerably under the
regime of Secretary McNamara, whose continual drive for economy
has resulted in an annual round of base closures in recent years.





In order to keep pace with the accelerated ZZZ pressure, and
perhaps gain a measure of forehandedness, the Navy has had to
counter with its own array of studies and reviews. In the early
I960' s many Base Utilization Studies were conducted, followed
more recently by a series of studies of the entire complex of
Navy field activities, under the aegis of the Navy Installations
Survey Group. These have been in-depth studies 3 requiring a
soul-searching determination of which activities were truly
"hard core" Navy requirements. Needless to say there have been
closure actions which have resulted from these studies. Just
how much further such reductions can go is anybody v s guess, but
it is evident that the pressures for economy will continue to
be a fact of life.
A Momentous 3USKIPS Decision
In Chapter II the subject of BUSANDA's lack of responsi-
bility for performance of supply functions in some important
segments of the Navy Supply System was briefly discussed. This
situation existed primarily at Naval Shipyards and large Naval
Air Stations, who have had major supply system responsibilities
and substantial amounts of system inventories in their custody.
Of course supply support is not the primary mission of shipyards
and air stations; the supply departments at these activities
have therefore had to assume the dual responsibilities of organic
station support and supply system support.
The existence of dual responsibilities for a shipyard
supply department is by no means a recent innovation. Indeed
the Navy Yards were a principal source of logistic support in
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the Navy s s earlier days, including the pre-World War II period
when only two Naval Supply Depots were in existence. As noted
in Chapter II, implementation of the Navy Supply Plan in 1947
did nothing to alter the situation. This is borne out by a
study conducted at the Philadelphia Naval Shipyard in 1948,
wherein the mission of the supply department was discussed.
While it was stated that the shipyard had no detailed supply
mission, it had responsibilities for supporting the ships berthed
in the yard and other Naval activities in the Fourth Naval
District, in addition to its general supply mission of support
to the Naval Shipyard. "3 The study went on to state:
The Supply Department, thus, is performing a dual role
in the sense that it is performing a Supply Department
function and a Supply Depot function. Percentage wise
these dual functions are split so that of all line item
requests for material received, 40 per cent constitutes
Shipyard requests and 60 per cent constitutes requests
from all other activities. 64
In recognition of the existence of this dual role,
BUSHIPS and BUSANDA have for many years cooperated in a system
of "split-funding" for shipyard supply departments. Thus BUSANDA
was able to discharge its responsibility for supply system
operations by virtue of its funding for that portion of the
shipyard supply department operation which was not organic to
the yard. And by virtue of its control over a portion of the
purse, BUSANDA gained a stronger — albeit limited — voice in
the operation of shipyard supply departments as a segment of the
Navy Supply System.
63U.S., Department of the Navy, Philadelphia Naval




The system of split-funding worked tolerably well, but
it was not devoid of problems. For one thing shifts in t] 2
proportion of supply system versus industrial workload inevitably
worked to the advantage of one bureau and the detriment of the
other. Since shipyards are industrial-funded and must pass on
their overhead to their "customers," uncontrollable fluctuations
in their supply department costs could play havoc with over:
rates. Prom the BUSANDA viewpoint an undesirable rigidity
existed when increasing system workload dictated the requirement
for more BUSANDA dollars; even if these dollars were available,
their use could be frustrated if hiring of additional people
became impossible for lack of personnel ceiling, which \
controlled by BUSHIPS. In addition, the time and attention of
the shipyard Supply Officer were divided between two basic
responsibilities, and it is understandable that the needs of the
shipyard (whose commander is his boss) would predominate, some-
times to the detriment of the supply system responsibilities.
Lastly, shipyard commanders generally did not relish being held
responsible for supply system functions which were alien to the
basic mission of the shipyard.
For all of these reasons, BUSHIPS and BUSANDA came to an
agreement that it was in the best interests of all concerned
that the shipyards be divested of supply system responsibilities.
There have been several pronouncements on the subject, one of
which was a BUSHIPS/BUSANDA 'joint letter on June 1, 1965 which
stated that the two bureaus were "engaged in a joint program to
transfer responsibility for management of non-industrial "supply

58
functions from Naval Shipyards to Naval Supply Centers and Naval
Supply Depots. "65
The first action to be taken in implementation of this
policy was the establishment of NSC Charleston on January 2, 1964.
Supply system responsibilities had grown immensely at NSY
Charleston because of the assignment of responsibility for
support of Polaris submarines; consequently the need for change
was most apparent at Charleston. The supply center was created
from portions of the former shipyard supply department, leaving
the residual supply department with personnel, facilities and
responsibility for support of only the shipyard.
Similar action was taken at Long Beach with the creation
of a Naval Supply Center on April 1, 1964. A third dichotomy
was performed at NSY Puget Sound on October 2, 1967 • This
transaction was complicated by the existence of NSD Seattle
across the sound, but a suitable plan was developed for consoli-
dation of the functions and facilities of the two activities.
Upon creation of NSC Puget Sound the NSD Seattle was disestab-
lished.
Full implementation of this policy was expected to take
a number of years in deference to the detailed planning and
complexities involved. There are still six shipyards which hold
some supply system inventories; however, three of these (Norfolk,
San Francisco Bay and Pearl Harbor) have relatively minor
quantities because of the proximity of existing Naval Supply
°5joint letter from the Bureau of Ships and the Bure
of Supplies and Accounts to the Chief of Naval Material, serial
731-202 and E2/1096, dated June 1, 1965.
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Centers and the fact that local arrangements have been made to
reduce much of the duplication. Completion of this program
awaits the introduction of additional, advanced data processing
capability which will permit item control at multiple locations.
On balance, a great deal has been accomplished toward implementa-
tion of the joint BUSHIPS/BUSANDA policy and it is reasonable
to assume that complete implementation will be a reality in the
not-too-distant future.
Observations
In bringing this chapter to a close let us reflect for
a moment on the significance of some of the changes which have
been discussed.
With two notable exceptions the development of the Navy
supply support organization since 19^7 has been limited to
actions internal to BUSANDA and its field organization. As was
noted in Chapter II, BUSANDA 1 s authority has not been commensurate
with its responsibility for administration of the integrated Navy
Supply System. True integration has been a function of coopera-
tion among Navy bureaus, and the vested interest of technical
bureaus has acted as a damper. Notwithstanding, the actions of
BUMED and BUSHIPS must be counted as exceptions.
In the case of medical and dental material BUSANDA
assumed responsibility for both inventory control and distribu-
tion activities in 1952. BUMED was thereupon completely out of
the wholesale supply management business except for its in-
alienable responsibility for technical control over this material.
The action of BUSHIPS is even more noteworthy, in the
opinion of this writer. BUSHIPS had bzen, from the outset,
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participant with BUSANDA in the inventory management functions
through the SDCP's. However, the shipyards under BUSHIPS had
control over substantial quantities of supply system inventories.
Unlike the medical activities, which were concerned with only a
single category of material, the shipyards possessed a complete
range of all categories of Navy material and had broad responsi-
bilities as major elements of the supply system. These responsi-
bilities were of such magnitude as to warrant the creation of
supply centers for performance of supply system functions. The
action of BUSHIPS, therefore, stands out as an important mile-
stone in the integration of the Navy Supply System. There is no
doubt that the BUSHIPS action was to some extent self-serving,
but parochialism was largely set aside in the transfer of control
over sizable inventories to BUSANDA.
There remains one major segment of the Navy Supply System
over which NAVSUP^ still has only tenuous authority — the
aviation segment. Major naval air stations have possession of
the majority of aviation material and their supply support
responsibility generally extends far beyond self-support. How-
ever, there has been no agreement comparable to that made in the
case of shipyards whereby supply system responsibilities would
be separated from organic support responsibilities. Further
discussion of this matter is reserved for Chapter IV.
Effective May 1, 1966 the name of BUSANDA was changed
to Naval Supply Systems Command (NAVSUP). The mission of the
command remained the same, so the acronyms BUSANDA and NAVSU--
may be considered synonymous if confusion results from attempting




Another observation on the materiel contained in this
chapter is that the emergence of DSA has significantly altered
the role of NAVSUP in the area of inventory management. DSA has
assumed responsibility for item management of nearly all common
material. This has left only peculiar, technical items for
management by the three remaining Navy inventory control points
(ICP's — the current term for the former SDCP's). These ICP's
(ASO, SSO and SPCC) nov; devote most of their effort to weapons
system support rather than to stock control. That is, the ICP's
determine requirements for repair parts support of Navy equip-
ments, prepare allowance lists and load lists, maintain technical
data files and insure that the necessary material is available
either through Navy peculiar inventories or from the DSA system.
The cumulative effect of the above changes on NAVSUP is
twofold: a reduction in scope but increase in complexity and
specialization in the inventory management area, and an expansion
of responsibility in the supply distribution system. With DSA
playing a dominant role in inventory management, the thrust of
NAVSUP* s Navy Supply System responsibility must be on weapons
system support and on exercising overall supply system responsi-
bilities through a network of major storage and distribution
activities (supply centers).
A final observation is that the Navy's highly regarded
inland supply depots have all but disappeared. During and
shortly after World War II there was much ado about the desira-
bility of well designed, efficient storage facilities strategi-
cally located to back up congested coastal facilities, and about
the necessity for dispersal of material.
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A prime reason why inland depots no longer exist is, of
course
,
that they have fallen victim to the economy axe. This
was a topic discussed at the 1954 BUSANDA Field Conference in
the course of reviewing a new policy of stocking in depth at
the point of use, a move designed to minimize echeloning of
stocks and reduce the cost of a vast movement of material between
stocking points. However, the feeling at that time was that the
new policy would actually result in additional dispersal by
spreading reserves at many stock points rather than concentrating
them at inland depots. °7 The facts of life were well stated in
a presentation at the 1961 Commanding Officers' Conference:
The distribution, or physical side of the system, has
been rather sharply reduced since 1947. As these reductions
have taken place, we have been careful to retain those
activities in direct support of the fleet. Better to
release a valuable inland storage facility — with its
general mobilization advantages, than to chance a reduction
in our immediate direct support capability. This has been
a governing principle as we have faced ug to the pressures
of a level budget and increasing costs. 60
Two factors can be cited which serve to minimize the
potential seriousness of losing the inland depots for purposes
of dispersal. First, the existence of DSA and its complex of
distribution facilities has reduced the requirement for Navy
rozerve stocks of common supplies. The "reserves" of this
material can be considered to be in the DSA wholesale system,
positioned at the various DSA depots throughout the country.
Secondly, the increasing emphasis on self-sufficiency of fleet
°7tj.s., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies a:
Accounts, ?r ings of BUSANDA Field Conference , November 1-5*
195^ j pp. 'I76-1622.




units is a measure of dispersal in itself since the inclusion
of essential material in allowance lists reduces the reliance
on shore-based stocks.
Summary
This chapter has traced the many changes in the Navy
supply support organization since the inception of the Navy
Supply System in 19^7 . In describing these changes an attempt
..as made to analyze the reasons why the changes took place ;
certain observations were offered as to the effect of these
changes.
The discussion of organizational changes was organized
in accordance with the four primary causes: further development
of the supply system., the trend toward centralization, economy
measures and the effect of a BUSHIPS decision. The net effect
of all of the changes was a tremendous reduction in the number
of BUSAI\TDA (NAVSUP) field activities, a recasting of NAVSUP's
inventory management role as a result of DSA 8 s emergence, and
an extension of NAVSUP' s authority over the supply distribution
network.
A recap of these organizational changes is provided in
Appendix A for convenience of reference.

CHAPTER IV
CONSIDERATIONS BEARING ON THE CURRENT ORGANIZATION
So far we have traced the development of the Navy supply
support organization up to the present time. The task of
reviewing and evaluating the current organization remains to be
accomplished. However, before proceeding with this task, let
us review some of the factors 'which have a bearing on the shape
the organization takes and the manner in which it functions.
While this paper has concentrated on matters of organiza-
tion, the implication is that these matters have a bearing on
the effectiveness and efficiency of supply support of the Navy.
In order to avoid the impression that organization is being held
out as an end in itself, one may turn back to 19^5 and the
Eberstadt Report, wherein this sobering reminder is provided
:
In preparing this report on military organization, we
recognize the inherent limitations of focusing our attention
primarily on questions of structure and organization. Great
leaders have in the past won victories despite outstanding
weaknesses in the organization over which they exercised
command. Experience proves that good organization and good
leadership can be rendered inadequate if confronted with
overwhelming forces or if required to operate in an un-
favorable environment. Even where highly effective organi-
zations are planned and set up in advance, personality and
environment remain as variable and unpredictable factors
which can undo the most carefully conceived administrative
plans
.
Hence, when we deal with questions of military or._ Ra-
tion, we realize that our analysis must comprehend other
factors as well....And so, when we come to grips with
organizational problems, we do so with a full consciousness
of the limitations inherent in such an approach. °9




This word of caution applies equally well hers as in the
Eberstadt Report. Nevertheless, the focus on organization is
deemed to be useful to provide insight into one facet of the
Navy supply support story.
One further word of caution concerns the transitory
nature of both organizations and the regulations and directives
which affect their status. This is to prevent undue emphasis
on the printed word, which is neither unalterable nor inviolable.
For example, Navy Regulations may be considered one of the more
sacrosanct of all Navy publications, but changes in people,
problems, resources, circumstances and ideas all contribute to
the requirement for updating or, in fact, finding other ways for
the meeting of requirements. The point is that one should not
base an argument solely upon a directive which has been issued
at one time or another, since those in charge of issuing the
directive can, and usually do, find reasons for bringing about
changes. At best, quotations from past directives and regulations
reflect the ideas existing at the time, but these ideas are
always subject to challenge.
With these caveats in mind, let us proceed with the
review of some of the factors influencing the organization for
.:avy supply support.
The Nature of the Navy Supply System
One of the most burning issues in the field of Naval
logistics in recent years has been the lack of a definition
just what the Navy Supply System is. In the report of the
3USANDA Component Study Group (an input to the Dillon Report]
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the statement was made that a policy document defining the scope
of the Navy Supply System has never been issued. This was cited
as the reason why the Navy Supply System remains somewhat vague
and its lines of authority clouded. 70
Lacking a policy document which defines the Navy Supply
System, a number of study groups , in the process of exploring
supply or logistics problems, have found themselves at a loss
when trying to come to grips with this so-called "system." ^hey
were forced to either skirt the issue or undertake their own
definition. The following citations are illustrative of the
problem.
In 1962 a private research organization, Dunlap and
Associates, produced a paper entitled "The Navy Supply' System
Ashore." They did not offer a definition per se but noted
that the supply system is a vast complex of over 300 activities,
ranging in size from huge supply centers to the small supply
departments of secondary air stations. The report goes on to
state:
The system goes far beyond the confines of the BUSANDA
managed activities; in fact, a majority of the supply
facilities are not managed or controlled by BUSANDA
(despite the widely accepted Navy myth that BUSANDA runs
the supply system). To be sure, these account for only
about 15$ of the system in terms of operating budget;
nevertheless, they manage and stock about half the
inventory, over which BUSANDA can exercise little or no
control.
It is more important to emphasize here that the "supply
system" is in fact a rather amorphous grouping of many
70
' U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Final Report of the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts
Component Study Group , Part of Review of Management 01' the
Department of the Navy, August 31, 1962, enclosure 17, p. 21.
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independently managed systems, often with very little real
mechanism for^ internal control or coordination between the
system parts. 71
The Material Management study of the Dillon Report also
took cognizance of the problem of unclear authority and responsi-
bility within the Navy Supply System. Included in the discussion
of this problem was mention of the fact that Navy Regulations
had assigned certain inventory management responsibilities to
BUSKIPS AND BUWEPS. This has reference to the so-called "Bureau
controlled material/' for which the technical bureaus act in their
own behalf as inventory control points instead of delegating this
responsibility to BUSANDA managed ICP's. In order to clarify
these responsibilities, the following recommendation was made:
17. That the Navy Supply system be defined to exclude
the inventory management functions performed within material
bureaus and to include all field supply processes, procedures,
activities and facilities participating in the procurement,
inventory management, storage, and distribution of Navy
material to the operating forces. 72
No action was forthcoming on the recommendation of the
Material Management Study. However, the heightening interest
in efforts to improve Navy logistic support, including an interest
expressed by the Secretary of Defense, led to the appointment of
a Material Support Steering Committee in December, 1964. Among
other things this committee was charged with developing u a clear,
T^Dunlap and Associates, Inc., The Navy Supply System
Ashore , Working Paper No. 2 under Contract Nonr-3042(00-),
February 1, 1962, p. 1.
T^U.S., Department of the Navy, Material Management
Study
, One of Seven Department-Wide Contributory studies
conducted as Part of the Review of Management of the Department




concise description of the Navy Supply Support System, expressed
in layman { s terms . "73
To carry out the detailed work required , the committee
created a Navy Logistic Support Task Force. One of the products
of the Task Force's efforts was a publication entitled "Logistic
Support of the Navy" which described the logistic support respon-
sibilities of the various organizational elements involved in
the process; it went into some detail to describe the functioning
of the logistic support system. However , when it came to
describing the Navy Supply System, the authors resorted to crea-
tion of their own definition "for the purpose of this report,"
as follows:
. . . the Navy Supply System encompasses those people,
skills, facilities, funds, inventories, policies, plans,
programs, and procedures throughout the Department of the
Navy that together produce technical supply aids, determine
quantitative requirements, and provide centralized inventory
management and distribution of Navy material on an item basis
so that all material can be applied to requirements when they
exist. The system extends from the Departmental level
(developing Bureau/BUSANDA) to Bureau or field inventory
control points (ICP's), the distribution system stock points
of the Naval Material Support Establishment and to the lowest
echelon at which item information and distribution authority
is held by an inventory manager. 74
Upon completion of the descriptive document "Logistic
Support of the Navy," the Task Force used it along with existing
laws, regulations, concepts and practices as the basis for an
analysis of logistic support in the Navy. 75 The findings of the
73Memorandum from the Vice Chief of Naval Operations to
the Deputy Chief of Naval Operations (Logistics), serial
3882P41, dated December 16, 1964.
U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Logistic Support of the Navy (NAVPERS 10495) , 1965; p. 48.
75u.S., Department of the Navy, Navy Logistic Support




Task Force i described and grouped into major projects with
remedial objectives, which were compiled into a document entitled
"Navy Logistic Support Improvement Plan" (NAVLOGSIP). One of
these findings, predictably, was that "there is a need to define
the Navy Supply System and to designate the organizational
elements responsible for the functions therein. "76 The Task
Force stated that it was unable to find an authoritative defini-
tion of the Navy Supply System, and considered this a major
problem within the Navy. So NAVLOGSIP objective number four was
established for the purpose of defining the Navy Supply System
and indicating the organizational element responsible for each
function. 77
The group which was assigned the task of accomplishing
NAVLOGSIP objective number four was the one referred to in the
introduction to this paper. It is they who turned their efforts
co the writing of a book describing how the Navy is supplied and
purposely avoided becoming enmeshed in the organizational web.
It is they who began their book with the statement "there is no
Navy Supply System in the sense of an organization with a
structure of command and inherent responsibility." But after
proceeding to explain the meaning of this statement, the








hus, in sum, the Navy Supply System as it exists — in
practice but not in organization — is the network of people,
resources, material, processes and organizations, regularly
interacting to accomplish the vital function of keeping the
Navy supplied. 7o
The foregoing is ample evidence of the dilemma surround-
ing the definition of the Navy Supply System. All of the
definitions offered recognize that it is not possible to produce
a simple, cut and dried definition and that the system is in
reality a complex which permeates throughout the entire Navy,
regardless of organizational lines. Despite all of the attempts
at a definition, there is still no official, authoritative
definition in existence, so future study groups will doubtless
continue to wrestle with the problem.
Perhaps the question should be raised as to whether the
Navy Supply System is really a system at all. Stanley Young, in
his book Management: A Systems Analysis
,
quotes Richard Johnson
(and others) in defining a system as "an organized and complex
whole; an assemblage or combination of things or parts forming
a complex or unitary whole. "79 And later Young offers a
definition for a normative system, as follows:
A system is a collection of entities or things (animate
or inanimate) which receives certain inputs and is con-
strained to act concertedly upon them to produce certain
7°u.s., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Naval Personnel,
Supplying the Navy (NAVPERS 10487) , 19&7, P- 1-
79stanley Young, Management: A Systems Analysis
(Glenview, Illinois: Scott, Foresman ana Company, 1966), p. 5,
quoting Richard Johnson, Fremont Kast and James Rosenzweig,
The Theory and Management of Systems (New York: McGraw-Hill
Book Company, 1903), p. 4.
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outputs 3 with the objective of maximizing some function of
inputs and outputs. 80
The first of these definitions is divided into two
components. The Navy Supply System defies the primary component,
which holds that a system is an organize 1 whole. The secondary
part of the definition requires only that a system be an assem-
blage or combination of parts forming a complex or unitary whole.
Under this more liberal definition the Navy Supply System does
seem to qualify, but there might be some question as to whether
the unitary whole ceases to exist if the combination of parts
becomes too loosely joined.
The second definition, that of a normative system is not
as abstract as the first and is therefore easier to use for
purposes of comparison. In elaborating upon this definition,
Young notes that the basic parts of a system are the input, the
process or operations, and the output. 81 it follows that, for
a system to be effective, the system manager must have the neces-
sary control over the process to insure that the inputs are
converted into the desired outputs. On this point Young cites
a statement of Johnson et al that the "objective of control is
to maintain output, which requires the ability to rearrange
resources as conditions change. "82 in measuring the Navy Supply
System against this definition there is apparently a good fit
°°Young, pp. 15-16, quoting Richard B. Kershner, "A
Survey of Systems Engineering Tools and Techniques," Operations
Research and Systems Engineering , Charles D. Plagle, ' am
Huggins, ancTHbDert H. Roy (eds.) (Baltimore: r_ 'ohns Hopkins








since there is a collection of entities receiving inputs which
must be operated upon in order to produce the desired outputs.
However, as has already been described, the Navy Supply System
falls short when you consider the manager *s ability to control
the operating parts of the system, including the ability to
rearrange resources. Limitations on the ability of NAVSUP
(BUSANDA) '.o control the system will be discussed further in the
next section.
Curiously a presentation at the 1963 Navy Supply Con-
ference, in discussing what the Navy Supply System is, also
resorted to the fundamental step of defining a system. In so
doing it called upon Webster 5 s Dictionary for a definition very
similar to the first one quoted from Young's book. Noting t]
increasing fragmentation brought on by uniform DOD procedures,
the presenter commented that the Navy Supply System is not whole
in relation to its support responsibilities a. lat there was
no supply system as an entity by itself unless it was defined in
much narrower terms than had been the custom. °3 However , no
such narrower definition was offered.
So far the difficulty in defining the Navy Supply System
has been discussed mainly in terms of the multifarious organiza-
tions which claim a role as participants in the system. However,
in addition to organizational questions, there is als
problem of defining what material is included in the syst< The
recommendation in the Navy Supply Plan (cited in C sr II]
"3-j.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of I lies 1




that categories of material of a replenishable nat :>uld
included in the Navy Supply System as jointly decided upon by
the cognizant technical bureau and the C ' i JSANDA. This,
of course, allows for retention of certain material by the
technical bureau.
In his testimony before the Committee en Organization of
the Department of the Navy in 1958, Rear Admiral Lj--.c.v (then
Chief of BUSANDA) took note of the situation. Admiral Boundy
expressed satisfaction with the organization of the Navy Supply
System, but he went on to state that the system at that time
contained about 1,200,000 items worth $5.0 billion while the
technical bureaus controlled 36,000 items wort.-. $7.2 billion.
He stated that this material under the technical bureaus was
not in the Navy Supply System except for storage, and recommended
that the technical bureaus get out of the business of inventory
management of so-called "secondary items. """'
This same view was given by the BUSANDA Component Study
Group in its contribution to the Dillon Report in 1962. The
Group noted that, when technical bureaus did divest themselves
of inventory management of certain material, they spoke of
transferring these items to_ the Navy Supply System.°5
The D0D Supply Management Reference Book states that "it
is baeie Navy policy that inventory management of Navy material
will be assigned to the ICP's under the command of BUSANDA. °°
o^James W. Boundy, "Testimony Before the Committee en
Organization of the Department of the Navy/' 195
85 IDA, Report of Component Stu;- - up , re 17,
p. 20.
°°U.'S., Department of Defense, Supply Mar
Book, January 1965 > P« 19-
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It goes on to say that other bureaus and offices will manage
only those items for which acquisition and continued control
are essential to the discharge of their peculiar mission. Such
items include those which are in a research and development
stage, those of such technical complexity that bureau engineering
decisions must be made prior to issue, and those which satisfy
a one-time requirement.
With all of the confusion in attempting to define the
Navy Supply System, it would be presumptuous to prescribe an
organizational structure here nor may this be what is really
needed. It is possible, however, to delimit the problem in order
to serve a given purpose and this will be attempted in Chapter V,
with full awareness of the hazards involved.
Limitations of NAVSUP Control
When considering the organization for Navy supply support
it is impossible to ignore the central role of the Naval Supply
Systems Command (formerly BUSANDA). The very name of the command
links it inextricably with the Navy Supply System, but unfor-
tunately this name creates an illusion which belies NAVSUP ! s
tenuous authority over certain segments of the "system."
The Navy Supply Plan contained language which would have
BUSANDA assigned the responsibility for the performance of supply
functions in the Navy Supply System. The BUSANDA Organization
Manual of 1950 reflected this responsibility in the delineation
of one of the bureau's functions as "supervises and directs the
operation of the supply phases of the Navy Supply System.
!,°?
87U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Bureau of Supplies and Accounts Organization Manual
(NAVSANPA Pub. 'TV) , April 1, 1950, p. 3.
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Language of this sort continued to appear in various documents
and publications up until recent years, stating, for example,
that BUSANDA is the bureau concerned with material and supply
management88 or that the Chief of BUSANDA is the Navy Supply
Manager and is responsible for the development and direction of
the Navy Supply System. 89
The current edition of NAVSUP' s charter, however, contains
no such reference to directing or operating the Navy Supply
System. As contained in the organizational manual of the Naval
Material Command, which is nov; in the chain of command as
NAVSUP 1 s immediate superior, the following are included among
NAVSUP's responsibilities:
Administer the Navy Supply System.
Provide supply management policies and methods for Navy
material . . .
Perform supply management functions for items assigned
to the NAVSUP ICP's.
As the Navy's Supply Manager, develop and supervise the
Navy Supply System. 90
Clearly the stress in these statements is upon administering,
supervising and coordinating rather than upon directing or
operating. It would be easy to get lost in a semantic jungle in
°°U.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Proceedings of the Navy Supply Conference
,
April 6-8, 1$64, p. E-f'. '.
^9dod, Supply Management Reference Book , p. 18.
9°U.S., Department of the Navy, Naval Supply Systems
Command, "Management of the Navy Supply System," Presentation




attempting to interpret the meaning of these words, but rather
than belabor the point , let us suggest use of the word "manage-
ment." This word has a broad meaning and can encompass all of
the foregoing; it is also appropriate since NAVSU? has been
acknowledged as the Navy's Supply Manager.
Having proposed the word "management" to describe
NAVSUP' s supply system responsibility, let us now provide a
connotation for the term and see how it relates to NAVSUP'
s
situation. A management system, according to Young, is a sub-
system of an organization. In relating this to the subject of
control he states that "the management subsystem can be viewed
as the basic control component of the organization, and, in this
context, the functions of management and control become
synonymous. "91 Applying this concept to the Navy Supply System,
the system manager — NAVSUP — should have implicit ability to
control its operation. In other words, NAVSUP would have
authority to influence output and adjust resources as circum-
stances change. We have already seen that this is not so in
many cases; therefore, NAVSUP' s "management" authority as the
Navy's Supply Manager is subject to reservation. Let us explore
this matter further.
In January 1966 the incumbent Chief of BUSANDA, Rear
Admiral H. J. Goldberg, made a presentation to the Chief of Naval
Material which included a description of how BUSANDA manages.
In describing the Navy supply distribution system, he noted that
it included many activities which were not under BUSANDA 's
control and which had primary functions other than supply
S^Young, pp. 15 and 26.

77
(e.g., shipyards, air stations). Admiral Goldberg continued:
Some people think we in S & A [BUSANDA] run the Navy's supply
system. This is far from the truth. No one person or
organization does.92
In describing his degree of control over the non-BUSANDA
managed supply distribution activities, Admiral Goldberg said
only that he furnished supply guidance to them. He made no
pretense that he directed or controlled the supply functions at
these activities. Instead he said:
. . .it's hard to see how this complex could be called
a system. But, believe me, it is! There is an interaction
and interdependence among all of these activities and a
common purpose.
Although no one organization in the Navy controls the
whole complex, BUSANDA exercises the most influence and
it is our influence that welds this complex into a system. 93
So without claiming even a measure of control over these
activities, Admiral Goldberg acknowledged that BUSANDA was
limited to the exercise of "influence."
There is little doubt that the Navy's bureau system has
been a prime deterrent to the adequate definition of the Navy
Supply System and the fixing of unqualified responsibility for
its management. Bureaucracy in the Navy is almost legendary and
over the years has proven to be a formidable obstacle to change.
James E. Hewes wrote that the "Army and Navy have been powerful
bastions of bureaucratic conservatism" and have closed change
92k. J. Goldberg, "BUSANDA Problem Briefing," Presenta-
tion Delivered at Chief of Naval Material Management Information




for its own sake. 9^ Above all, he notes, bureaucratic organiza-
tions are concerned with preservation of their traditional
independence.
An interesting observation of this phenomenon was made
by the Chief of BUSANDA in the year in which the Naval Supply
Plan was implemented. Rear Admiral W. A. Buck said:
A war development that is a very strong influence in
the Departmental organization and operation is that of the
complete feeling of responsibility and desire for authority
that has been developed in the various bureaus. That is of
particular significance to us as a service organization
rendering functional or specialized service to all bureaus.
The pressure of war on each bureau chief brought a more
acute and direct feeling of responsibility for whatever
category of material he was responsible for. They in turn
developed much more of a desire to handle all of the phases
of that logistic operation rather than to delegate. They
are not comfortable in a situation where another bureau not
directly under their control shares that responsibility. 95
Admiral Buck also commented on the situation as it
pertained to field activities:
We find ourselves as a service bureau held responsible for
a supply or fiscal function in a field activity under the
direct management control of another bureau. This is a new
situation and it is not without its difficulties. 96
The circumstances noted by Admiral Buck in 19^-7 have
continued to the present day. For example, in its report to the
Dillon Board the BUSANDA Component Study Group, in discussing
the evolution of the Navy Supply System, stated that the technical
bureaus never completely divorced themselves from supply
y^James E. Hewes, Jr., "Management vs. Bureaus," Marine
Corps Gazette , Vol. 51 (February 1967), pp. 39-4l.
95'j.S., Department of the Navy, Bureau of Supplies and
Accounts, Conference of Supply Corps Officers , Sept. 29-




functions. 97 Further, the report commented that authority over
all functions having a significant effect upon the administration
of the supply system is not centralized at any level subordinate
to the Secretary of the Navy. Despite this fact, the report
indicated that BUSANDA was generally looked to when questions
of supply effectiveness or responsiveness arose. 9^
The existence of multiple-bureau responsibility in the
area of supply management was one of the primary reasons why
NAVLOGSIP objective number four xvas established to define the
supply system and designate the responsible organizational
elements. NAVLOGSIP stated that about 50,000 items were retained
by the developing bureaus for management. It also stated that
there was a popular belief that management of all aspects of
these items was a responsibility of BUSANDA, whereas in reality
supply management functions are performed in all material
bureaus for bureau controlled and production material. 99
Insofar as the role of non-BUSANDA field activities,
their use as part of the Navy supply distribution system was a
conscious act. In the review of a new directive aimed at
increasing the effectiveness and efficiency of the supply system,
conferees at the 1954 BUSANDA Field Conference were told that
one of the objectives was to provide supply support of fleet
and minor shore activities from adjacent stock points, regardless
97BUSANDA, Report of Component Study Group , enclosure 17,
pp. 19-20.
98ibid.
, p. 12 of basic report.
59kavy Logistic Support Task Force, Navy Logistic
Support Improvement Plan
, pp. II-l through II-3.
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of bureau management lines. It was noted that a potential
problem existed in the assignment of service-wide supply functions
to non-3USANDA managed activities. However, the committee which
made the report felt that performance of some decree of service-
wide functions was acceptable to the parent bureaus of these
activities .1
Rear Admiral Arnold, Chief of BUSANDA at the time, stated
that "we have been talking for many years of having an integrated
supply system" and further that "one of the ways it works is
that we use the capacity of a given stock point, no matter what
its prime purpose is, as an element of the supply distribution
system. "2 He did note, however, that budgetary difficulties
existed at air stations. By and large the conferees were
optimistic about the use of non-BUSANDA managed field activities
and the cooperation of their parent bureaus. However, despite
the sensibleness of the policy , it committed BUSANDA to a course
of action which worked to remove increasingly large quantities
of material from activities under its direct control.
The Dillon Board took cognizance of the vagueness of
the Navy Supply System and of BUSANDA 1 s responsibilities; the
Board made recommendations which, in its view, would make the
Chief of BUSANDA "truly the Navy's Supply Manager." The Board's
report stated that BUSANDA "should be the primary technical
bureau of the Naval service . . . concerned with material
management in its broadest sense" and that "in its strengthened




position, the Bureau of Supplies and Accounts would be the
material management agency for the Naval Support establishment. "3
It goes xvithout saying, however, that recommendations of
a study group, no matter how "high powered," do not assure
automatic acceptance and implementation. Captain J. H. Garrett,
in reviewing the Dillon Report before the I963 Navy Supply
Conference, noted that it contained many references regarding
the idea that the Chief of BUSANDA would have a stronger hand
in his role as the Navy's Supply Manager. But he noted that the
report lacked specific recommendations on "just how these many
fine-sounding words and phrases can be implemented."^- The
Dillon Report did result in some basic changes to the Navy
organization — primarily the placing of the Chief of Naval
Material over the material bureaus — but the basic questions
regarding the Navy Supply System and the role of BUSANDA (NAVSUP)
remain with us.
Lest there be any remaining question about the limita-
tions of BUSANDA f s control of the Navy supply support organiza-
tion, let us touch upon the subject of funds control. It is
axiomatic that the organization which provides the funds will
have far more than a casual interest in how they are spent. For
our purposes, the funds which are of interest are those for both
procurement of material and operation and maintenance of field
activities.
3'J.S., Department of the Navy, Review of Management of
the Department of' the Navy (NAVEXOS P-25koA ), Decemoer 1?, -l>"52,
pp. 101-103 and 147-148'.




In the case of material, recall that the Navy Supply-
Plan recommendation, as approved, was that all replenishable
items in the Navy Supply System would be financed by the Naval
Stock Fund. The stipulation about replenishable material would
generally exclude material which is properly managed by a
technical bureau. BUSANDA, as the manager of the Naval Stock
Fund, would then control the funds for the procurement of all
other material. However, this has never been the case. Through
the years much of the technical material has been financed by
the "Appropriation Purchases Account" under the control of the
technical bureaus. At present there is only one major category
of material which is totally funded in this fashion — aviation
material. Hence the Naval Air Systems Command (NAVAIR) continues
to have an inordinate interest in the management of this material.
The impending implementation of the DOD Resources Management
System, however, could alter this situation since it requires
the stock-funding of all consumable material.
As for operations and maintenance (O&M) funds, each
field activity is dependent upon its parent bureau or command.
Thus NAVSUP controls 6&M funds only for the activities under its
management control. The split-funding arrangement for shipyards
has already been discussed; it still exists for certain shipyards
but action is underway to divorce the NAVSUP and NAVSKI?
interests. In the case of air stations there has never been a
split-funding agreement, so NAVAIR has had the total responsi-
bility for funding of these activities, including the system-vie:
o
supply support functions. This is also true of many other
activities which are of minor import to the supply system.
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Again, the words of Admiral Buck in 19^7 are pertinent.
He said, "it is my firm belief that when you do not control the
money for the performance of a function for which you are
responsible, you do not control the function. "5 He also stated
that "there is no satisfaction in attempting to be the man
responsible for a function when you have to go to other bureaus
and obtain funds for that function by the process that I describe
as the s tin cup method.' "^
It is now twenty-one years since the implementation of
the Navy Supply Plan and there are still doubts as to the limits
of NAVSUP's authority in the management of the Navy Supply System.
This is exemplified by the fact that it was deemed necessary, in
November 1967, to present to the new Commander of NAVSU? a
current interpretation of what the Navy Supply System is and
what his responsibilities are in managing the system.
7
Nobody, it seems, would advocate the complete control of
supply matters by NAVSUP. For example, the report of the BUSANDA
Component Study Group to the Dillon Board, even though noting
the problems occasioned by fragmented authority and responsibility
in the supply system, stated that "complete centralization in
BUSANDA is considered neither practicable nor desirable. "8
However, the report did say that a more precise definition of
5BUSANDA, 19^7 Conference of Supply Corps Officers ,
p. 47.
6
^ i. } p. 49.
^NAVSUP, Presentation to the Executive Board by
CDR Chadwick, November 28, 1967.






, and provision in fact for BUSANDA technical
direction over supply functions, would lessen the problems.
ore must be a middle ground somewhere — but will bureaucratic
emotionalism ever permit a rational solution?
Other Considerations
The subject of theoretical organizational considerations
is well beyond the scope of this paper and in any event is
covered quite extensively in the management literature. However,
there are practical considerations which must be considered.
Many have already been discussed at some length and need not be
explored further. Following is a recap of these matters for the
sake of convenience:
•*-• Economy . The pressure for economy is inexorable and
has led to a number of base closures and consolidations, as
discussed in Chapter III. It will continue to have a strong
influence on future organizational actions.
2. Centralization . As stated at the 19^3 Navy Supply
Conference, "it is hard to escape the conclusion that the trend
toward centralization is inevitable. "9 in connection with the
establishment of DSA, Dunlap and Associates described the
upheaval in the organizational structure of DOD supply and
logistics components as a "bloodless revolution."-1- The effect
upon the Navy supply support organization was described in
Chapter III.
^BUSANDA, Proceedings of the 19^3 Navy Supply Conference
,
p E8.




3- Pressures on the Navy Supply System
. These pressures
come both from within the Navy ( e.g. , the technical bureaus) and
from external sources such as Congress, DOD and DSA. At the 1961
Commanding Officers 9 Conference it was noted that there are
differences of opinion within the Navy as to the proper shape
and scope of the supply organization. 11 In 1968 these differences
are as pronounced as they ever have been.
^. Influence of ADP . Although mentioned only briefly
heretofore, it is a fact that the rapid development of ADP
capability has had a dominant influence in the field of supply
in recent years. It is the vehicle which has made possible much
of the centralization, unification and standardization which mark
the current supply support organization and modus operandi . Rear
Admiral John Crumpacker, former Chief of BUSANDA, wrote in 1962
that ADP has made possible the first real integration of service
supply systems. 12 There is no doubt that ADP will continue to
play a key part in shaping the future supply support organization.
In addition to the above, there are three topics which
have been briefly discussed and which merit elaborations (1) the
requirement for control, (2) aviation supply; and (3) the area
support concept.
The Problem of Control . Perhaps the central question
regarding the character of the Navy supply support organization
is that of control. As the Navy's Supply l^anager, how much
lj
-BJSANDA, 196i Commanding Officers' Conference
,
p. OL-8.
12John Crumpacker, "The Navy Supply System: Where It's
Been, Where It's Going," Naval R eview
,
(Annapolis: United
States Naval Institute, ly&d), p. 2/4.
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control does KAVSUP need over the various elements of the supply
system? In accordance with Young's description, management
and control can be considered synonymous. So, as the Navy's
Supply Manager, NAVSUP must have control over the supply system
if it can rightfully claim the title of "manager." However, it
is a certainty that nobody would advocate absolute control in a
vertical supply organization extending down to the smallest ship
or station. But where do you draw the line?
An answer to this question is difficult to find. However,
part of the answer must lie in the fact that there are different
types and degrees of control; hence, what is necessary for one
situation may be totally inappropriate for another. E. K.
Anderson differentiates among line, staff and functional relation-
ships and observes that, as organizations go through an evolu-
tionary process, they will experience the need for adjusting,
adapting and reorganizing. For example, a staff organization may
grow in stature and importance and be granted functional
authority, empowering it to issue binding instructions to other
organizational units rather than merely providing advice. The
functional officer exercises control over his function throughout
the organization, normally by requiring conformance with certain
procedures or regulations. In turn, the functional organization
may grow in importance to the point where its output is identified
as a distinct product or service, thereby earning it the designa-
tion as a line unit performing one of the operations of the
enterprise. 13
•^s. h. Anderson, "Line, Staff and Functional Relation-
ships," Curr ent Issues and Emerging Concepts in Management
,




For our purposes, the distinction between line control
and functional control expresses the necessary relationship.
NAVSUP has line authority over field activities under its manage-
ment control, but only functional authority over supply operations
at other activities. In terms of Anderson ! s article, management
should be alert to changing circumstances which may dictate a
modification to the existing line or functional organization.
In other words, does a supply department at a given activity
fulfill the requirement or should a supply center be established?
The answer to such a question is largely subjective, but it must
be a function of the size and scope of supply operations being
performed.
A parallel can be drawn between the treatment of supply
functions and virtually any other function performed at a Naval
activitiy; e.g
. ,
personnel, communications, medical. Each of
these functions is the responsibility of a particular head-
quarters activity, so if a vertical organization were to be
established in each of these areas it would result in the
splintering of each field activity into innumerable separate
commands. Such a situation would be intolerable, but at the
other extreme the lumping of all functions, regardless of size,
scope or complexity, into a huge single field activity may be
equally intolerable. The question becomes, "At what point does
a function achieve such size and importance to the responsible
headquarters command that it' should be broken off and managed
separately?" For the answer we must consider the question of
funds control. In the case of supply functions, NAVSUP does not
control the funds for supply operations at non-NAVSUP managed
activities (except that split-funding still exists at some

88
shipyards). Therefore, if NAVSUP»s functional control require-
ments exceed the availability of resources at a given field
activity, a problem arises. This same situation could exist
for other functions, but the sheer volume of clerical and
materials-handling workload associated with a large supply
activity could present a problem of much greater magnitude than,
say, requirements imposed by a change in communications procedures.
This paper has already discussed the fact that NAVSUP
does not have control over certain major segments of the supply
distribution system. By way of comparison, Lieutenant General
McNamara had this to say about command jurisdiction over DSA
depots:
DSA requires that it have command jurisdiction over
distribution depots where it is the dominant user for the
same reasons that the military services require that they
exercise control of the distribution facilities where the
items they manage are stored and issued. In other words,
DSA must have complete control of the supply system for
DSA-managed commodities to provide for unity of command and
undivided responsibility for management of common supplies.^
Apparently General McKamara was unaware that the Navy's Supply
Manager did not enjoy the same degree of control as he was
describing for DSA!
Without attempting to specify finite criteria, let us
assert that NAVSUP should have line authority over Navy ICP*s
and major distribution activities, and functional control over
supply operations at other activities. The determination of
what constitutes a "major" distribution activity would be
primarily based upon the dominance of supply system workload
versus station support workload. Only by direct control of such





major supply activities can NAVSUP truly claim to be the Navy's
Supply Manager. Without such control NAVSUP can act only in a
staff capacity to a supply manager at a superior organizational
level, whoever that might be.
Aviation Supply . Turning now to the topic of aviation
supply, it has already been noted that the normal pattern does
not apply. Through the years Naval aviation has often been
accused of being a "separate Navy," and some of the current
circumstances do nothing to destroy the myth. It is ironic that
aviation material, for which the first SDC? was created, is the
last major category which is not stock funded. Thus NAVSUP is
not directly involved in funding for procurement of aviation
material. In addition, there has never been an O&M funding
arrangement at major air stations whereby NAVSU? has joined in
partnership in order to discharge its supply system responsi-
bilities. The matter is even more involved at the present time
since major air stations are now commanded and funded by fleet
commands, thereby completely removing them from the naval
material organization.
To gain an appreciation of the scope of this segment of
the supply system, a degree of specificity is necessary. Of
the many air stations in the Navy, only seven are of sufficient
size, supply-wise, to be considered major wholesale stock points
for aeronautical material. These are the seven "industrial
Naval air stations" (INAS's) at Norfolk, Jacksonville, Quonset
Point, Pensacola, Alameda, North Island and Cherry Point. These
seven INAS's together carry $2.1 billion of the Navy J s total
inventory of $9»5 billion, or 23 per cent of the total. In
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terms of volume of business, the INAS's make 20 per cent of ail
the issues in the Navy Supply System. When considering only
peculiar aeronautical material, the figures are all the more
impressive. The INAS's have in their possession 70 per cent
of all Navy aeronautical material ($1.5 billion of $2.2 billion)
and process 69 per cent of all Navy issues of this material. 15
Ey any measure the INAS's are very important elements
of the Navy Supply System. Yet the Navy's Supply Manager has
a very limited voice in the operation of this element. NAVSUP's
functional control is devoid of meaning when resources at the
INAS's are not made available to carry out NAVSUP policies and
procedures or when conflicting directives are issued by the
agency which has line control authority. Such instances have not
been uncommon.^ The fact remains that aviation supply has
retained a character of uniqueness which seems to have resisted,
at least in part, the trend toward standardization and centrali-
zation.
Area Support Concept . In recent years the "area support
concept" has been advanced as the prime method of reducing
duplicative inventories and achieving economies in supply opera-
tions. Under this concept all wholesale levels of material in a
given area are consolidated under a Naval Supply Center, with
other activities in the area satellited off of the NSC and hold-
ing only retail levels of material as required for local support.
^NAVSUP, Presentation to the Executive Board by
CDR Chadwick, November 28, 1967.
1
^BUSANDA, Final Report of BUSAKDA Component Study Grc; „
encl. 13. p. 5.
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Early efforts at area support concentrated only on selected
activities in an area. For example, the Bay Area Support plan
in the San Francisco area involved NSC Oakland and the two local
shipyards at Mare Island and Hunter's Point. A major migration
of material from the shipyards to the NSC took place in 1959-
1960, resulting in a reduction of about 70 per cent in the range
of material carried by the shipyards and a personnel savings
estimated at 300-400. 17 Similar consolidations have taken place
at NSC Norfolk, first from the shipyard and later from the air
station. As significant as these actions were, they amounted to
only partial consolidation and did not involve all activities in
the area.
A more ambitious undertaking was begun in the San Diego
area in 1966. Recognizing the potential benefits of the plan,
CNO approved a test at San Diego whereby all wholesale inventories
at all activities in the area would be managed by NSC San Diego.
^
In some cases the consolidation involves physical movement of
material to the NSC while in other cases substantial quantities
of material are left in their original location, near the point
of greatest use ( e.g. , aviation material at air stations). The
important point is that all wholesale levels of material are
centrally managed by the NSC, with heavy reliance upon the use
of responsive on-site retail outlets, rapid communications and
central data processing capability. In addition to anticipated
economies in operations and inventory investment, the area
l^Roland A. Petrie, "The Bay Area Supply Support Pattern,"
Thesis Submitted to U. S. Naval Postgraduate School, Monterey,
1965, pp. 45-46 and 57.
^Letter from the Chief of Naval Operations to the
Chief of Naval Material, serial 84p4l, dated February 23, 1966.
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support concept serves to reduce the span of management at
activities supported by the NSC, thereby freeing management
attention for matters more directly related to the primary
mission of the supported activities.
A thorough evaluation of the San Diego test has yet to
be made. Notwithstanding, NAVSUP is committed to the area support
concept. 19 Considerable progress has already been made, and still
greater progress is promised in the near future when increased
data processing capability will permit individual item control
at multiple locations. Full acceptance and implementation of
the concept will have the effect of giving NAVSUP control over
all wholesale levels of material in the supply system, since the
hub of supply activity in each area will be a Naval Supply Center
under NAVSUP' s management control. To this end the establishment
of NSC's at Charleston, Long Beach and Puget Sound constitute
important steps toward future application of the area support
concept since these activities will be the nucleus of the plan
in their respective areas.
Summary
In this chapter some of the difficulties and "facts of
life" surrounding the organization for Navy supply support have
y
oeen discussed. In particular, there has never baan an adequate
definition of the Navy Supply System which has met with universal
acceptance. This has complicated the role of NAVSUP since, as
the Navy's Supply Manager, there is doubt as to the extent of
^NAVSWP, Presentation to the Executive Eoard by
CDR Chadwick, November 28, 1967.
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its authority over a system possessing ill-defined boundaries.
Further, there are practical limits to NAVSUP* s control over
supply matters since it is widely acknowledged that virtually
every ship and activity in the Navy has some part to play in the
process. It is unnecessary and unthinkable that NAVSUP should
have direct control over supply matters at all of these activi-
ties.
The question of control is one of degree. Line control
by NAVSUP is necessary only in the case of major supply activi-
ties, which have a significant supply system responsibility.
The large majority of activities support primarily themselves,
with supply system involvement of little consequence. For these
activities, the exercise of functional control over supply
matters is all that is necessary for NAVSUP to discharge its
responsibility as the supply manager.
Other factors which have a bearing on the current supply
support organization are the continued distinctiveness of
aviation supply and the emergence of the area support concept as
NAVSUP' s master plan for the future.

chapter v
Evaluation of ths present orgaiti2::-t"c:t
The evolution of the Navy supply support organization
has been traced up to the present time and some cf the factors
which bear upon the present organization have been reviewed.
Let us now proceed with the task of describing and evaluating
the present organization.
Description
The present Navy supply support organization, while
considerably changed from the 19^7 version, nevertheless retains
many of its basic characteristics. There are still inventory
control points which are the "nerve centers" of the supply
support complex, and of course there are still storage/distribu-
tion activities. Much has been learned since 19^7 about advanced
inventory management techniques. Procedural changes, new
management concepts and mechanization have all made their mark.
The supply support organization has had to adapt to these and to
all of the changes which have been discussed previously.
The number of Navy inventory control points has dwindled]//
to three: ASO, ESO and SPC.C. Since DSA has taken over the
inventory management of common material, the Navy ICP^ are left
with only that material which is peculiar to Navy pments.




inventory control had been the major effort of IC? : s in yz^-z
past, the emphasis has now shifted to weapons :. . support.
The term "inventory control point" is really descriptive of only
a minor part of the effort of these three activities. Perhaps
the term Weapons System Support Center would be more appropriate,
since these activities are heavily concerned with assuring
allowance list support for weapons systems, regardless of whether
the material comes from a Navy source, a DSA source or whatever.
In addition to the three NAVSUP-rnanaged ICP's, Navy
inventory managers also include the System Commanders (ex-bureaus)
and Project Managers. These commands are responsible for managing
items in a research and development state, items of unstable-
design, end items of major importance, and certain reparable
items for which engineering decisions or configuration control is
essential. System Commanders and Project Managers manage about
two per cent (less than 30,000) of all Navy items, but this
represents about 3^ per cent of the total money value of Navy
managed inventories. Inventory management for the remainder of
Navy material is the responsibility of the three NAVSUP-rnanaged
ICP's. 20
The Fleet Material Support Office is now the only Navy
Retail Office, and as such has the responsibility to budget for
the procurement of items managed outside of the Navy (primarily
by DSA) and administer allotments to the stock points who effect
the actual procurement. 21 Separate retail offices for various




commodities of material had been created initially, as explained
in Chapter III. However, it was subsequently determined that
these functions were not sufficiently distinctive, so all retail
management functions were consolidated at FMSO.
The major distribution activities at the present, time
are listed in Table 3, along with the number of items carrie
and the dollar value of inventory at each activity. The prepon-
derance of supply system wholesale inventories is located at
these twenty-one activities, consisting of seven supply centers, •
two supply depots, five shipyards and seven air stations. There
is no convenient or fully acceptable way to differentiate between
wholesale and retail inventories, but since the twenty-one major
stock points hold something less than half of the dollar value
of all supply system inventories, a few words of explanation are
in order.
In the case of Navy Stock Account (NSA) material, the
$459 million of material not in the custody of the major stock
points is widely dispersed. There are about 165 shore stations
which carry primarily "retail" inventories to satisfy their own
organic requirements, with only an incidental requirement to
furnish material to others. In addition, the Navy Stool: Fund
finances the resale inventories of some 80 commissary stores and
700 ship's stores, as well as the NSA inventories of 43 tenders
and repair ships. When considering the large number of activities
which hold NSA inventories, it becomes more apparent that a
substantial percentage of these inventories is concentrated at




MAJOR STOCK POINTS IN THE NAVY
SUPPLY SYSTEM - 1968
(Continental U. S. only)





NSC Norfolk 841,934 108.9 333.
NSC Oakland 891,141 89.2 356.0
NSC Charleston 308,471 56.0 254.5
NSC Long Beach 146,745 17.7 101.3
NSC San Diego 196,420 24.7 54.1
NSC Puget Sound l87,442(b) 24.3( b ) 67.2(b)
NSC Newport 70,281 15.2 8.1
NSD Mechanic sburg 28,737 6.0 189.7
NSD Philadelphia 107, 631(c) 0.2 0.0


























NAS Jacksonville 298,390 8.3 253.9
NAS Pensacola 203,051 4.9 186,4
NAS Quonset Point 182,690 3.8 191.9
3 Norfolk 190,079 0.6 39^-0
MCAS Cherry Point 195,938 4.2 * 234.1










(a)As of June 30, 1967.
( D )Figures are combined for NSY Puget Sound and NSD
Seattle, predecessors of NSC Puget Sound.
(c)primarily blank forms and publications.
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As for APA material, there is a total of 153 activities
which hold this material. Much of the dollar value not controlled
by the major stock points is located at ordnance activities;
ammunition, which for most purposes is not considered a part of
the Navy Supply System, accounts for about $2.8 billion of the
APA inventory. Much of the rest of the APA inventory not at the
major stock points is comprised of the high cost, low turnover
"bureau controlled" material (complete equipments and major
components) which normally does not require storage at readily
accessible tidewater locations.
Table 3 vividly portrays the relative importance of the
seven air stations, as described in Chapter IV. By way of
contrast the shipyards now play a much less prominent role as
elements of the supply system. Three of them — Charleston,
Long Beach and Puget Sound — are no longer included in the list
of major stock points. The inventories at Norfolk and San
Francisco Bay are considerably reduced from their former propor-
tions because of the proximity of NSC ? s Norfolk and Oakland and
the fact that area support arrangements have been consummated.
All told, the present reduced role of shipyards reflects the
progress of the NAVSHIP/NAVSUP program to relieve shipyards of
system supply support responsibilities. This same effect can be
seen in the very small inventory of NSA material at NAS Norfolk,
which has an area support arrangement for this material with
the supply 'center.
The major stock points carry all types of material,
regardless of who the inventory manager of the material might be.
Thus, for example, supply centers have custody of material
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managed by System Commands, and air stations stock considerable
quantities of non-aeronautical material. All stock points carry
appropriate quantities of DSA managed material. In other words,
a headquarters command's management responsibility for a given
stock point bears no particular relationship to the inventory
management responsibility for the material stocked at that
activity.
The Navy J s Supply Manager, NAVSUP, is the command which is
most directly concerned with the operation of the supply system.
The NAVSUP field organization is the primary instrument through
which this responsibility is discharged. NAVSUP has line
authority over its field organization (the ICP's, the retail
office, the supply centers and supply depots), and functional
authority ever supply operations at other activities, including
shipyards and air stations. This functional authority is given
substance in General Order No. 19> which states that "officials
charged with command . . . responsibilities shall discharge their
responsibilities with due regard for the system-wide aspects of
support efforts where service-wide systems control responsi-
bilities have been assigned." 22 The Navy Supply System is cited
as an example of such a service-wide system.
Evaluation and Prospects for Future Change23
The present Navy supply support organization has a totally
different complexion than that of twenty years ago. The pressure
22U.S., Department of the Navy, General Order No. 19 ,
October 20, 1964.
23Some of the ideas included in this section were gain
from discussions with CDR W. A. Chadwick, Head, Advance Plans
Branch, Naval Supply Systems Command, during the period
January 2, 1968 through March 8, 1968.
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of past events and the erosion of time have had a considerable
effect upon the shape and scope of the organization. Economy
measures have reduced the number of supply activities to a point
where it is difficult to imagine how further reductions can be
effected (except that certain consolidations can be brought about
under the area support concept). Meanwhile, the Navy supply
organization has become incapable of independent, complete
support; the Navy Supply System can now be considered to be in /
partnership with DSA, and therefore is a component of the DOD
Supply System.
within the Navy supply distribution system there are
still several major stock points which are beyond the management
control of NAVSUP (Table 3). As has been noted previously, the
scope of supply system operations at shipyards is but a fraction
of what it had been years ago. The NAVSHIP/NAVSUP program to
divest shipyards of supply system responsibilities is still in
force , and there is every reason to believe that it will be
completed in due course. With the progress made to date, inven-
tory levels at the shipyards generally are already within
tolerable limits. However, the seven industrial air stations
stand out in marked contrast. These activities are indeed
major elements of the supply system, yet are only nominally
under the influence of the Navy's Supply Manager. As far as
field activities are concerned, the seven INAS's are the out-




While the role of NAVSUP as the Navy k s Supply Manager is
still subject to debate, it appears that a better blueprint
exists now than has previously been available to extend NAVSUP 5 s
influence ever the supply system. That blueprint is the area
support plan. Area support offers the potential of at once
accommodating many of the pressures upon the z^yoly organization
and alleviating some of the difficulties caused by divided
responsibility. In particular, full implementation of the area
support concept should result in the following:
1. Maximum potential for economy in supply operations
and inventory investment.
2. A high degree of utilization and exploitation of
centralized computer facilities.
3. Increased supply system responsiveness L>y virtue of
having a larger pool of accessible back-up inventory in each
area
.
k. Freeing the time of managers at supported activities
so that lore of their attention can be devoted to their primary
mission.
5. Placing of the large majority of wholesale supply
system inventories under the custody of Naval Supply Centers and
thereby under NAVSUP' s line authority and funding control.
6. Adherence to a basic principle of the impending DOD
Resource Management System in that 0&M funds for major supply
operations will flow from NAVSUP, who in large measure is
ultimately responsible for the supply system workload.
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Full acceptance of the area support plan would coinci-
dentally eliminate one of the major distinctions of aviation
supply, the custody of most of this material by .vities not
under NAVSUP' s management control. The other major distinction,
funding of aviation material through the Appropriation Purchases
Account, is scheduled to be eliminated in conjunction with
implementation of the Resource Management System en July 1, I968,
The above description of the potential merits of the
area support concept should not be taken to mean that NAVSUP 1 s
problems are over. Area support is far fro:-.: being a fai:- r.cccmpli
since the first real test has yet to be completed and evaluated.
The keynote to its success is acceptance — acceptance by the
supported activities, by fleet commands and by headquarters
commands. Strong resistance is, in fact, being experienced from
aviation commands. A natural skepticism is to be expected from
the field activities (and their superior commands) \:ho in the
past have controlled their own inventories and who now arc most
assuredly looking to NAVSUP with a "show me" attitude. It
therefore behooves NAVSUP to diligently apply its efforts to
assure the success of the plan. Dynamic and imaginative leader-
ship, coupled with a sincere effort to prove the worth of the
plan to others, are essential to insure that the objectives of
area support are achieved. A lesser effort can lead to failure —
failure of acceptance — and with it the loss of a real oppor-
tunity to overcome some of the difficulties which have persisted
throughout the life of the Navy Supply System.
Oh the subject of the Navy Supply Syste e is no
intention that this paper will contribute to growir .st
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of suggested definitions. However, certain observations are
appropriate based upon some of the points discussed in the
paper.
le evidence suggests the existence of a basic dilemma
caused by the apparent incompatibility of, on the one hand,
defining the Navy Supply System to embrace all facets of supply
throughout the Naval Establishment, and on the other hand
assigning NAVSUP the responsibility for administering this system,
even though the system extends far beyond the limits of NAVSUP 1 s
direct authority. This dilemma can perhaps be resolved by,
first of all, acknowledging that absolute control of the entire
supply system by NAVSUP is not necessary, and then carefully
delineating the degrees of control necessary over the various
segments of the system. The distinction between line control
and functional control is important to this case, and proper
application of these two types of control should servo to clarify
and reinforce NAVSUP 1 s role as the Navy's Supply U nager. To
this end the following comments and opinions are offered;
1, "Z'hQ Navy Supply System must be defined to include
all types of material, regardless of whether inventory management
is performed by NAVSUP managed ICP*s or Syste:..: Cc:._:v:.ers. The
definition must also be inclusive of all activities and commands
which play a part in the system, again without regard to :
ment responsibility.
2. NAVSUP c s line control need extend c se key
activities which have major supply system : Dnsibilities a.
which together control the preponderance of wholesale syst
inventories. These activities are the ICP ? s and the ck
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points, with necessary control of the latter to be achieved via
the area support plan as described above.
3. Functional control over the remaining elements of
the Navy Supply System will suffice to give NAVSUP the necessary
leverage to carry out its responsibility as the Navy Supply
Manager. To be effective, however, this functional control must
be recognized and accepted by all concerned, to an extent greater
than now exists. Such control in fact, and not just in theory,
is necessary to insure uniformity of supply policies and pro-
cedures and to provide true unity and integration within the
supply system.
NAVSUP functional control over supply management
operations of other System Commands and Project Managers is also
envisioned since these commands control material which must be
recognized as included in the overall Navy Supply System.
Functional control in this area is a radical departure from
presently existing practice, but it is not without precedent.
For example, the preeminence of BUPERS in military personnel
mutters is acknowledged throughout the Navy, and even more to
the point is BUMED's complete functional control in the area of
professional medicine, tfhile not pretending to equate the supply
profession with the medical profession, the analogy is neverthe-
less pertinent in that the influence of the "system" manager must
extend throughout the Navy.
With acceptance of the principles embodied in the above-
discussion, there should be no concern with a broad definiti
of the Navy Supply System which extends beyc li
NAVSUP »s direct control. NAVSUP can adequat Ifill lugs
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responsibilities by the proper combination of line control and
functional control, provided that these forms of control are
extended as indicated. Judging by past experience this is easier
said than done, but acceptance of these principles by all con-
cerned is essential if the Navy Supply System is ever to achieve
true integration and unity.
While the present Navy supply support organization does
not measure up to the above description, its responsibilities
are, however, the same as they would be under the envisioned
organization. The basic responsibility is, of course, support
of the fleet and other Navy activities. As previously mentioned,
the existence of DSA has altered the nature of the Navy supply
management task so that the current thrust is on weapons system
support and management of Navy owned material. Let us briefly
touch upon these two tasks.
Since DSA controls most common material, Navy ICP f s
perform inventory control functions only for Navy peculiar
material. However, the stock points must also be counted as
participants in the management of Navy owned material because
DSA, acting as a large supplier, treats Navy stock points as
customers of its system. Responsibility for determination of
requirements for DSA material is decentralized to individual
Navy stock points, with the Fleet Material Support Office exer-
cising fund control and providing inventory decision rules.
Thus major stock points act in many ways as their own inventory
control point for Navy-owned stocks of DSA material, while for
Navy peculiar material they assume a more passive role as
distribution points under the centralized inventory control of
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the three ICP's. It may be said, then, that the Navy ICP's and
major stock points share the total responsibility for control of
Navy-owned material and that they are inextricably bound together
in the management and distribution of Navy peculiar material.
This fact argues for the indivisibility of ICP's, major stock
points, and NAVSUP as the vital links in the chain of distribu-
tion, control and policy direction for Navy material.
Turning now to weapons system support, it has previously
heen stated that this has become the major responsibility of the
ICP v s. The focus here is no longer upon individual items of
supply, but upon the weapons systems and equipments which these
items support. It is in this arena that the true marriage
between technical and supply functions now takes place. This
is also the area of greatest sensitivity, since adequacy and
responsiveness in the support of weapons systems is a prime
concern of top commanders in the fleet and at Navy headquarters.
Because of this, many of the problems associated with support of
sophisticated new weapons systems have generated an abundance of
criticism about the performance of the NAVSUP managed IC? ? s. It
is beyond the scope of this paper to review the lengthy and
complicated issues involved here or attempt to determine to what
degree the criticism is warranted. Suffice it to say that the
discontent has been severe enough to cause high level proposals
for altering the organizational status quo . Cno such proposal
is to transfer management responsibility for the ICP's fr




NAVAIR) and another is to establish a Logistics Command to
embrace all logistics functions of the present System Commands.
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Although serious consideration has been given to these proposals,
there has been no action taken toward their implementation.
However, it should not be implied that the issue is dead; con-
tinuance of knotty logistic support problems could cause a tidal '
wave of discontent which might well precipitate the demand for
radical change.
Separation of the ICP's from NAVSUP's management realm
would probably be a most unfortunate occurrence. As seen by
this writer, it would result in the disintegration of any
semblance of an integrated Navy Supply System since a vital link
would be removed from the chain connecting the supply manager
and his integral control and distribution activities. Such a
move would tend in a direction opposite from that described for
the further integration of the supply system, namely full
implementation of the area support concept and extension of
NAVSUP's functional authority over the remaining supply opera-
tions. There is no doubt that weapons system support is a
critical part of the total supply effort; this is where the
interface occurs between supply support and the maintenance and
operation of Fleet equipment. However, efforts to improve
weapons system support should proceed within a strengthened
supply system rather than disembodying the system and permitting
each System Commander to go his separate way. Should this
happen, it is easy to envision the return to multiple supply
systems such as existed in World War II.
So in weighing the prospects for future change , we must
recognize that there are opposing forces which could cause the
Navy supply support organization to take on quite a dif i t
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appearance. There seems little doubt that further changes will
take place , but the nature and direction of change is quite
unpredictable. The changes advocated in this paper would result
in complete integration of the Navy Supply Systc
,
with area
support and true functional control by NAVSUP being the prime
ingredients. Slow progress in this direction is presently being
made, with much depending upon the success of the area support
test. At the opposite extreme is the complete abolition of the
Navy Supply System as we now know it. This could occur should
NAVSUP and its field organization fail to live up to the expecta-
tions and meet the requirements of the commands and activities
which depend upon this organization for supply support. In view
of recent pressures on the organization, it is not hard to take
the pessimistic view; however, there are those of us who remain
eternal optimists and are convinced of the ef'Il^^zy of an
integrated Navy Supply System. The objectives of the .1947 Navy
Supply Plan have yet to be fully realized, but the basic concepts
embraced by this plan are still considered sound.
It may be said that NAVSUP is at the hub of an organiza-
tion which presently has some loose spokes, which must be either
tightened or lost. However, so long as there is a Navy there
will be a need for a supply support organization which is closely
identified with its fleet customers. Whether this organization
is built around NAVSUP or takes the form of a Logistics Command
remains to be seen — the next chapter in the evolution cf the




In this chapter the present organization for Navy supply
support was briefly described. There are but three TCP's
presently in existence, and twenty-one major stock points hold
the preponderance of Navy wholesale inventories. Of these stock
points, twelve are not under the management control of NAVSUPj
five shipyards have a relatively minor role in the supply system,
while seven industrial air stations have a major role.
Evaluation of the present organization centered on the
degree of integration of the system under the control of NAVSUP.
Complete integration can be achieved through full implementation
of the area support plan and extension of NAVSUP's functional
control over the supply system. Acceptance of these measures
should alleviate many of the difficulties in defining the Navy
Supply System.
There is at present a school of thought which would
remove the ICP's from NAVSUP' s control and another which would
establish a Logistics Command to perform the entire range of
Navy logistics functions. Prospects for change in this direction
would produce a totally different supply support organization
than the fully integrated Navy Supply System envisioned in this
paper. However, regardless of the form which future change may
take, there will continue to be a need for a Navy supply support





Prior to World War II, BUSANDA playec a dominant role in
the supply support of the Navy. The Navy was relatively small
and uncomplicated, and the tempo of operations permitted the
use of cumbersome, closely controlled procedures Tor centralized
procurement and distribution of standard stock material. How-
ever, the enormous and urgent demands of wartime, coupled with a
rapid expansion in technical equipment to be supported, proved
to be far more than BUSANDA' s peacetime system could handle.
The result was a fragmentation of the supply system into some
thirty systems, most of them under the control of the Navy s s
technical bureaus. With such a dispersion of control, widespread
duplication of many common items of supply was inevitable.
The need for revamping the Navy's supply system after
World War II was very much in evidence. An extensive study of
the matter culminated in approval of the Navy Supply Plan by the
Secretary of the Navy on February 14, 19^7 • A basic feature of
this plan was the recognition that supply and technical functions
could be separately identified, and that there was a commonal .
in the supply functions which applied to all types of material.
The Navy Supply System was built upon this foundation, wit .




a single bureau, BUSANDA, and technical functions remaining with
each of the technical bureaus. The supply and technical functions
were brought together at a new type of field activity, called a
supply-demand control point, under the joint control of BUSANBA
and the cognizant technical bureau. An SBC? was to bo established
for each category of Navy material, patterned after the Aviation
Supply Office, which had been created during the war. To com-
plement these commodity oriented control points, Naval Supply
Centers were established at Norfolk and Oakland for the distribu-
tion of material through a series of specialized component depots*
The Navy supply support organization, as it existed at
the end of 1S&7> reflected both the effects of implementation of
the Navy Supply Plan and the remnants of a grossly expanded
wartime supply complex. The ensuing years have produced radical
changes in this 19^-7 organization. Changes through the :..id-1950 , s
took the form of a modest contraction in the number of storage
activities and the creation of additional SLOP'S and component
supply depots in furtherance of the Navy Supply Plan.
Since 1956 there have been two overriding factors which
have caused wholesale changes to the supply support organization:
a heavy demand for economy measures and a strong movement toward
centralization and unification of military supply matters.
Economy measures have been cited as the principal reason for
disestablishment of fourteen major supply activities in th .st
ten years. As for the movement toward unification, creation of
single manager operating agencies, and later of DSA, have had a
profound effect upon inventory management within Navy,
effect has been reflected in reductions both in t 2 number of
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supply support field activities and the nature and scope of their
operations. The trend toward centralization has also been evident
within the Navy organization, due in part to the emergence of
computers and their achieving of a position of importance as a
tool of supply management. This internal Navy centralization has
manifested itself in the reorganization of NSC's which eliminated
the component depots, and in various consolidations of supply
operations, including those resulting from area support arrange-
ments.
Another important change in recent years has resulted
from the NAVSHIP/NAVSUP program to divest shipyards of supply
system responsibilities. This has already resulted in creation
of three new supply centers and a reduction in wholesale inven-
tories at certain other shipyards, with long range plans to
complete the program.
In spite of all of the changes which have taken place
since 19^7, the objectives of the Navy Supply Plan have not bee.
fully achieved. In particular, implementation of rccc:. :.tion
number one of the plan has not been fully accomplished in that
NAVSU?'3 authority over the performance of supply functions is
encumbered with some significant limitations. This situation
must be considered incongruous since NAVSUP has been designated
as the Navy's Supply Manager and has been assigned the responsi-
bility for administration of the Navy Supply System.
Part of the difficulty is that there has never been an
adequate, acceptable definition of the Navy Supply System.
There is disagreement as to which commands and field activ:_ .
should be included in the system and what material is properly
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included. Consequently, NAVSUP's responsibility for administering
the Navy Supply System is clouded by the uncertainty of deter-
mining precisely the nature of the thing to be managed.
In addition to the lack of a definition for the Navy
Supply System, there are practical limitations to the extent of
NAVSUP's control. System Commands and Project Managers have
inventory management responsibilities for certain major equipment
and items with unstable design characteristics. Virtually every
ship and station in the Navy has some part to play in the overall
supply process, and several stations which are not under NAVSUP's
direct management control have a very sizable supply system
responsibility. Since NAVSUP lacks funding control over activi-
ties which are not under its management control, the extent of
its authority in these cases is necessarily limited.
In weighing the significance of these limitations, the
type and extent of control necessary for NAVSUP to carry out
its responsibility as the Navy's Supply Manager becomes a key
question. This paper has approached the question in terms of
line control and functional control. It is postulated that line
control by NAVSUP is necessary only in the case of those major
supply activities which have a significant supply system responsi-
bility. For all other activities, functional control over supply
matters is sufficient, so long as NAVSUP has the ability to
enforce compliance with standardized supply policies and proce-
dures.
Two other factors of significance to the current supply
support organization concern aviation supply and the area support
concept. Through the years aviation supply has maintained a
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unique character and in many respects stands as the biggest
deterrent to a truly integrated supply system. This situation
is most pertinent at the present time; developments in the field
of aviation supply could have a significant influence on the
future supply support organization. In contrast to the separatist
tendency of aviation supply is the area support concept. Under
area support a Naval Supply Center would manage inventories of
all wholesale material for all activities in a given area. The
plan promises to achieve maximum economy in supply operations
and inventory investment by integration of all wholesale inven-
tories in an area., with appropriate retail levels positioned at
supported activities. NAVSUP is committed to the area support
concept as its master plan for the future.
The existence of DSA as the inventory manager for common
material has altered the nature of the Navy supply job. The
principal responsibilities of the Navy supply support organization
are now weapons system support , inventory management of Navy
peculiar material and management of a Navy organic distribution
organization. Weapons system support has been a major effort of
the ICP's in recent years, and shortcomings in this area have
been the cause of considerable consternation. This had led to
various proposals for reorganization, such as the transfer of
ICP's to the appropriate "hardware" Systems Command and the
establishment of an omnipotent Logistics Command. To date no
action has been taken on these proposals, but the vital importance




The present Navy supply support organization is built
around three inventory control points and twenty-one major stock
points. The major stock points include five shipyards, which
collectively play a relatively minor supply system role, and
seven industrial air stations, which have major supply syzzc.:.
responsibilities.
NAVSUP, which is designated as the Navy's Supply Manager,
occupies a central role in the supply system but lacks authority
commensurate with its stated responsibility, for reasons already
mentioned. NAVSUP does not have line authority over all major
supply activities, nor does it have a proper measure of functional
control over other activities. However, difficult though it may
be, full implementation of the area support plan and proper
extension of functional control could bring about the true inte-
gration of the Navy Supply System. This would require acceptance
of these measures by all Navy commands, and acceptance can be
gained only if there is confidence that NAVSUP and its field
organization can adequately fulfill their responsibilities. This
is the challenge faced by NAVSUP, a challenge to realize the
objectives of an integrated Navy Supply System in keeping with
the basic concepts of the Navy Supply Plan of 1947.
Conclusions
From analysis of the information presented in this paper,
the following conclusions are drawn:
1.- The existence of many separate supply systems dur ng
World War II was an expediency, and the continuation of such a
potentially inefficient operation could not be justified.
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2. The Navy Supply Plan of 19^7 provided the basic
concepts for a considerably improved integrated Navy Supply
System. Time has proven these to have merit.
3. Since 19^7 there have been extensive changes in the
size and scope of the Navy supply support organization, caused
primarily by pressures for economy and the trend toward cen-
tralization and unification. Despite all of the changes, true
integration of the Navy Supply System has not been achieved.
4. The basic problem preventing full integration of the
supply system is a lack of agreement as to the nature and extent
of authority required by NAVSUP, the Navy Supply Manager. There
are some significant limitations on NAVSUP's authority at the
present time.
5. True integration of the Navy Supply System can be
achieved by full implementation of the area support plan and
provision in fact of functional control by NAVSUP over supply
operations at activities not under its line control.
6. Accomplishment of the necessary measures to achieve
full integration of the supply system depends upon acceptance of
these measures by all commands involved. In view of traditional
bureaucratic resistance to change 3 this acceptance must be won
by painstaking effort and the building of confidence by producing
results. This requires strong, dynamic leadership with attention
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